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Broadening Anachronistic Notions of




Preferential treatment of the traditional family unit pervades law
and society. Usually this deference is innocuous. In certain situations,
however, it discriminates against people who do not live in traditional
family settings, but who instead have formed other types of primary rela-
tionships. The preference for the traditional family seems particularly
unjust in medical decisionmaking for incapacitated adults involved in se-
rious relationships outside the societal norm.
One case provides an especially poignant example. On November
13, 1983, a drunken driver slammed into Sharon Kowalski's car, leaving
the twenty-seven-year-old woman "physically and mentally impaired."'
Both her traditional family-father, mother, and sister-and her room-
mate and lover of four years-Karen Thompson-spent as much time as
possible by Sharon's bedside as she lay in a coma for several weeks. As a
result of Karen's devotion, Sharon's father, Donald Kowalski, began to
feel uncomfortable about the nature of the relationship between the two
women. Donald Kowalski told Karen Thompson "that friends weren't
supposed to visit as often as [Karen] was visiting and if [she] didn't stop
visiting so often, he would see to it [Karen] couldn't visit at all."' 2
After consulting with the hospital psychologist, Karen wrote a letter
to Sharon's parents, Donald and Della Kowalski, explaining that she and
Sharon were lovers and that Sharon would want Karen's continued in-
volvement in Sharon's rehabilitation and life.3 The parents did not an-
swer, but when Sharon's sister responded to this letter by calling Karen
* B.A. & B.S. 1986, University of Kansas; Member, Third Year Class.
1. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 862-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
2. K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME
HOME? 17 (1988).
3. Id. at 21-25.
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"a sick, crazy person who has made up this whole story,"' 4 Karen de-
cided to sue for guardianship to protect her ability to see Sharon.5 Don-
ald Kowalski cross-petitioned for guardianship. 6
Karen agreed to Donald Kowalski's appointment as guardian,
avoiding a trial on the matter. In exchange for her acquiescence, Karen
received equal access to Sharon's medical and financial records, equal
visitation with Sharon, and an equal right to consult with medical and
financial personnel. The probate court never ruled that Donald Kowal-
ski was "the most suitable and best qualified among those available and
willing" to serve as guardian. 7 The court recognized "that Karen
Thompson and Donald and Della Kowalski each have a significant rela-
tionship with the Ward, Sharon Kowalski, and [found] each to be a suita-
ble and qualified person to discharge the trust."'8
Disagreements between the Kowalskis and Karen continued, how-
ever, and on October 31, 1984, Donald Kowalski moved to amend the
original guardianship order to end Karen's visitation and access. In re-
sponse, Karen moved for the removal of Donald Kowalski as guardian.
Both motions were dismissed on December 12, 1984.9 After renewed
motions by both Donald Kowalski and Karen, however, on July 23,
1985, the district court confirmed Donald Kowalski as guardian of
Sharon Kowalski, removing all limitations on his power as guardian. 10
The court admonished Donald Kowalski to "consider, regarding all visi-
tation decisions, that the primary consideration is the best interest of the
ward and any reliably expressed wishes of the ward, both of which may
change from time to time." 1 Notwithstanding this judicial direction, the
next day Donald Kowalski banned Karen Thompson from visiting
Sharon Kowalski. From August 1985 until recently, Karen could not so
much as see Sharon. 12
This Note, considering statutes and cases typical of those in all the
states, posits that the Kowalski case would have led to the same result in
any jurisdiction in the United States. The Note examines the state of the
law of guardianship and proxy medical decisionmaking and finds that the
law fails to serve the goals of guardianship for people in positions similar
to Karen and Sharon-unmarried adults in serious, quasi-marital rela-
4. Id. at 26.
5. Id. at 28.




10. Id. at 864.
11. Id.
12. K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 2, app. A, at 3. After a lengthy legal
battle, Karen Thompson finally was allowed to resume visitation with Sharon Kowalski in
February, 1989. The couple had not seen each other for nearly four years. N.Y. Times, Feb.
8, 1989, § D, at 25, col. 1.
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tionships in which one partner unexpectedly becomes incapacitated. The
goals of guardianship or proxy decisionmaking are to protect the best
interests of the incompetent patient or to implement the patient's own
self-determination through the decisions of another. 13 While other com-
mentators have focused on the potential for abuse of unfettered guardian-
ship power or the adjudication of incapacity, little attention has been
given to the common-law and statutory preference for family members to
act for the ward. This Note finds these presumptions inconsistent with
the primary aims of guardianship and proxy decisionmaking.
Section I discusses the evolution of the law's preference for family
members to serve as guardians and decisionmakers, from its common-
law origins to its codification in some states. The section also discusses
the development of the two goals of guardianship, serving the best inter-
ests of the patient and effectuating the ward's self-determination through
the guardian's use of "substituted judgment" in making decisions for the
ward. Sections II and III review the types of medical decisionmaking
and guardianship statutes and significant cases in each area. Section IV
critically analyzes the relevant cases and statutes and demonstrates that
rote appointment of legal next of kin does not fulfill either the best inter-
ests or substituted judgment goals for a significant number of unmarried
adult Americans who may become incapacitated. Section V discusses
changes that have been attempted already, such as living wills and dura-
ble powers of attorney, and explains why such attempts do not provide
enough protection for unmarried couples. Finally, section VI proposes
ways that both the courts and the legislatures can best protect the rights
of incapacitated single adults.
I. Development of the Law of Medical Proxy Decisionmaking
and Guardianship
Legal standards concerning who may make decisions on behalf of
incapacitated adults have been developing for centuries. Even in ancient
times, blood relatives were thought the best proxies. Although this as-
sumption remains largely unchallenged and unchanged, the goal of the
law has evolved. Originally, the law in this area aimed paternalistically
to do what was "best" for the patient. Now, the primary goal is to imple-
ment the patient's own will by standing in her shoes when making
decisions.
A. Preference for Family Members
The preference for family members to act for mentally incompetent
adults is deeply entrenched in Western civilization. For example, in 449
B.C., Roman law stated that a "fool" and his belongings should be pro-
13. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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tected by his family. 14 The family traditionally has played two different,
yet pivotal roles in the medical arena: making decisions for relatives un-
able to consent to treatment and serving as legal guardians for incompe-
tent relatives.
The role of the family as proxy decisionmakers has continued,
strengthened in part because of concerns over medical liability. Doctors
and hospitals can be held liable for battery, trespass, or, more likely now,
negligence, unless the patient first gives informed consent to the proposed
medical procedure. 15 When the patient herself is unable to consent, the
physician's duty is satisfied and liability usually avoided if the doctor
obtains consent from the patient's next of kin. 16 In fact, one commenta-
tor asserts that the tradition of seeking consent and advice from family
members is "so well known in society at large that any individual who
finds the prospect particularly odious has ample warning to make other
arrangements better suited to protecting his own ends or interests."' 17
Thus, the physician traditionally has abided by the wishes of family
members of incompetent adult patients without any legal formalities or
judicial oversight. 18 Indeed, the physician's most likely goal in deferring
14. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 1 (2d ed.
1971).
15. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960), was the water-
shed case, holding doctors liable for breaking their obligation "to disclose and explain to the
patient in language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed
treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of unfortunate
results and unforeseen conditions within the body." This respect for the autonomy of the
individual can be traced to Justice Cardozo, who stated: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society of the N. Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (overruled on other grounds in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d
3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957)).
16. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 n.92 (D.C. Cir.) ("Where the complaint in
suit is unauthorized treatment of a patient legally or factually incapable of giving consent, the
established rule is that, absent an emergency, the physician must obtain the necessary author-
ity from a relative."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ; Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d
304, 306, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (1967) ("[fln surgical cases, consent to such procedure must be
obtained from either the patient, or, if the patient is under some disability, from a near relative
capable of giving consent."); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 1 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT].
17. Capron, Informed Consent to Catastrophic Disease and Research Treatment, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 340, 424-25 (1974). Others, however, argue that "[tihe problem with this sugges-
tion is that it is not at all clear that any 'other arrangements' are legally binding upon the
physician .... " Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Bal-
ance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 475
n.203.
18. See Barber v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1020-21, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492-
93 (1983) (physicians properly consulted with wife for treatment decisions about incompetent
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to family wishes is to stay as far away from court as possible. This some-
what casual means of obtaining proxy consent, albeit age-old tradition, is
not immune, however, from challenge.19
By contrast, the appointment of a guardian to make decisions for an
incompetent adult is formal and legalistic. 20 Guardianship also has a
long history in English and American law.21 The king was the guardian-
protector of all his subjects, especially the young or the weak, 22 and the
sovereign exercised hisparenspatriae23 powers to enter the decisionmak-
ing process for incompetent adults. 24 Even though the king was formally
the guardian of adult incompetents, close relatives were usually responsi-
ble for the incompetent adult's actual care.25 Eventually, the courts be-
gan to favor appointing the incompetent adult's next of kin as guardian
of the incompetent. 26 Guardianship became part of a private, familial
husband); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277 (Jones,
J., dissenting in part) (physicians and families in actuality have been making decisions about
life-sustaining treatment for incompetent patients), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
19. See Gauvey, Leviton, Shuger & Sykes, Informed and Substitute Consent to Health
Care Procedures: A Proposal for State Legislation, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 445 (1978)
("family members ... are not legally entitled to give consent in the absence of any statutory
authorization"). Cases supporting this view include Beck v. Lovell, 361 So. 2d 245, 250 (La.
Ct. App.) (in absence of an emergency, spouse does not have authorityto consent to surgery
simply because of marriage relationship), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 802 (La. 1978); Gravis v.
Physicians & Surgeons Hosp. of Alice, 427 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1968) ("[T]he relationship of
husband and wife does not in itself make one spouse the agent of the other.").
20. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
21. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *460.
22. Id. *303; see also N. KrrrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 59 (1971) (quoting 2 L.
SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, IDIOTS AND
PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 6 (1833)) ("The King, as the political father and guardian of his
kingdom, has the protection of all his subjects, and of their lands and goods; and he is bound,
in a more peculiar manner to take care of those who, by reason of their imbecility and want of
understanding, are incapable of taking care of themselves.").
23. "[L]iterally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign
and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed.
1979). For an early chancery decision enunciatingparenspatriae, see Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P.
Wms. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722).
24. For examples of modern courts exercisingparenspatriae powers, see In re W.S., 152
N.J. Super. 298, 377 A.2d 969 (1977); In re Doe, 104 A.D.2d 200, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1984); In
re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 450 A.2d 1376 (1982).
25. Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship, and Alterna-
tives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 570-71 (1972).
26. See generally Sullivan v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183, 194, 244 P. 343, 347 (1926) (stating
that all other things being equal, the law prefers the adult children of the incompetent named
as guardians over strangers to the incompetent's blood); In re Estate of Colvin, 3 Md. 278
(1851) (stating that, contrary to more primitive times, the law now considers consanguinity a
suitable recommendation, and strong grounds must be shown before it will be disregarded); In
re Williams' Comm., 252 A.D. 314, 315, 298 N.Y.S. 881, 883 (1937) (court recognized that the
well-established practice is to appoint the choice of the incompetent's next of kin unless it is
impossible to find within the family circle or their nominees a qualified guardian). Many of
these older cases refer to appointing a "committee" over the incompetent rather than a guard-
April 1990]
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sphere, but remained subject to regulation by the courts. 27 In fact, a
tension that continues today developed between judicial intervention and
decisionmaking, and the role and power of the family. 28 Yet, whether
physicians rely on tradition and informally choose to consult with family
members when an adult is unable to give consent to treatment, or
whether the state adjudicates the matter and appoints a legal guardian,
chances are that the decisions still will be made by the incompetent
adult's closest relative.
B. Goals of Proxy Decisionmaking and Guardianship
Courts have held that the paramount consideration in appointing a
guardian 29 is the welfare of the proposed ward.30 To effectuate this goal,
courts traditionally have used the "best interests" standard, requiring a
guardian to do what is best, on an objective basis, for the ward. 31 Courts
now often rely on a more subjective standard, the doctrine of "substi-
tuted judgment," especially in cases involving consent to or refusal of
medical procedures.32
The doctrine of substituted judgment originated in an 1816 English
case in which the court allowed an incompetent adult's destitute siblings
ian. The purpose and powers were the same, and the committee often consisted of only one
person.
27. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23
ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 608-09 (1981).
28. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see generally Relman, The Saikewicz Deci-
sion: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 508 (March 2, 1978) (arguing that physi-
cians, patients, and families of patients alone should make treatment decisions); Baron,
Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 337
(1978) (arguing that judicial intervention is the only way to guarantee the incompetent pa-
tient's right to due process); see generally Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical Deci-
sionmaking for Incompetent Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis, 48 U.
PITr. L. REV. 539 (1987) (authored by Elaine B. Krasik) (advocating the rights of the families
of incompetent patients).
29. There are generally three types of guardianship: guardians of the person, guardians
of the estate, and plenary guardians (of both the estate and person). See, e.g., CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 2350, 2400 (West 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:6-16.10(b) (West Supp. 1981). In
this Note, the term "guardian" will be used only to refer to guardians of the person or plenary
guardians. "Conservator" will be used to refer to guardians of the estate.
30. E.g., Boylan v. Kohn, 172 Ala. 275, 55 So. 127 (1911); In re Andrews, 125 A.D. 457,
109 N.Y.S. 831, rev'd on other grounds, 192 N.Y. 514, 85 N.E. 699 (1908); In re Estate of Fox,
365 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1961).
31. In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 567, 307 N.W.2d 881, 894 (1981).
32. In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634,
405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 750-51, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d
647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see also DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 132-34 (stating that substituted judgment maximizes patient's
self-determination because the surrogate decisionmaker attempts to reach the same decision
that the incapacitated person would have made had the incapacitation not occurred).
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to take gifts from his estate because the court believed that was what the
patient would have done if he had been able.33 A United States court
first recognized substituted judgment in a similar case, refusing to award
a stipend to the stepdaughter of an incompetent man because the court
thought the man would not have given the money to his stepdaughter
before his illness. 34  In 1969, a court for the first time applied the doc-
trine of substituted judgment to a medical controversy and decided to
allow the transplant of a kidney from an incompetent child to his criti-
cally ill brother.3 5
Usually, the two standards produce the same result: decisions made
by a surrogate using substituted judgment should be the same as those
made in the incapacitated person's best interests, because most people
can be assumed to act for their own good. The best interests standard
and the doctrine of substituted judgment diverge, however, and may pro-
duce different results if the guardian decides to forego life-sustaining
treatment. Such a decision may be what the incapacitated person would
have chosen, yet objectively it may not be in the person's best interests to
pass up life-sustaining treatment. 36
The two standards also might vary in less extreme situations. Be-
cause the patient's best interests are determined objectively, they are, in
effect, based on what the majority of society believes is best. If a particu-
lar patient's personal views differ from the majority, use of substituted
judgment to implement her self-determination could conflict with what
most people would think to be the best course to follow. For example, if
the religious beliefs of an incapacitated patient in need of blood preclude
transfusions, the use of substituted judgment would lead her proxy to
reject transfusions. Most people would find transfusions to be in the pa-
tient's best interests, and, therefore, use of the best interests standard
would require the proxy to ignore the patient's wishes and consent to
transfusions.
The traditional tendency to prefer family members as proxy deci-
sionmakers will not further the goal of implementing a patient's self-de-
termination if the beliefs or views of the patient differ significantly from
her family's. Thus, reliance on tradition, even though codified in many
states, is misplaced. Tradition should not be allowed to undermine the
33. Exparte Whitbread, 2 Meriv. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). The court stated, "[I]t is
not because the parties are next of kin of the Lunatic, or, as such, have any right to an allow-
ance, but because the Court will not refuse to do, for the benefit of the Lunatic, that which it is
probable the Lunatic himself would have done." Id. at 103, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879 (quoted in
Annotation, Power of Court or Guardian to Make Noncharitable Gifts or Allowances out of
Funds of Incompetent Ward, 24 A.L.R.3d 863, 873 n.8 (1969)).
34. In re Willoughby, II Paige Ch. 257, 260 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
35. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
36. E.g., Note, Substituted Judgment in Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Per-
sons: In re Storar, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1173, 1177 n.24.
April 1990]
goal of the law of medical proxy decisionmaking. An examination of
statutes and cases, however, indicates that tradition is indeed controlling,
regardless of the relationship to self-determination.
II. Proxy Decisionmaking in the Absence of a Guardian
The term "proxy decisionmaker" can refer to anyone empowered to
make decisions for another person. Selection of the proxy may be infor-
mally accomplished, as when a physician asks for consent to treatment
from whomever is available at the time. Selection of a proxy may be
made formally through procedures to appoint a guardian for an incapaci-
tated person. Guardians are court-appointed proxies, imbued with spe-
cific powers. One could also choose her own proxy decisionmaker by
naming someone to act on her behalf in a durable power of attorney
executed before incapacity.
This Note uses the term "proxy decisionmaker" to refer to situa-
tions in which the court has not appointed a guardian and the incapaci-
tated patient has not legally empowered a proxy. Many jurisdictions
have statutes or case law that provide guidance to a physician as to
whom the proxy should be. Because physicians can be sued for treat-
ment performed without consent, they have strong incentive to seek con-
sent from someone other than the patient if the patient is unable to
consent. This incentive is even stronger in states that require informed
consent.
A. Statutes Designating Proxy Decisionmakers
Only twenty-eight states have statutes dealing with informed con-
sent. 37 Of these, twenty-two explicitly or implicitly provide for proxy
decisionmaking when the patient herself is unable to give consent to
medical treatment or procedures. 38 Most of these statutes explicitly
37. ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.556 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-561 (Supp. 1982);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-206 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (Supp. 1988); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 766.103 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2906.1 (Harrison Supp.
1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39.4304 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 147.137 (West 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,§ 2905 (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-41-3 to -15 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Supp. 1990); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.1 10 (1979); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2805-d (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.21.13 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.54 (Anderson Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32 (1985); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.01-6.07 (Vernon Supp.
1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (Supp. 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050, 7.70.060 (Supp. 1989).
38. ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.556(b)(3) (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(A) -
(B) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(a)(2) (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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grant legal relatives, in declining levels of consanguinity, the power to act
on behalf of the incompetent patient. Other statutes are less specific, ad-
ding little to the tradition of consulting family members, with which phy-
sicians are already familiar. None of these statutes suggests that a lover
or close friend of the patient might, in some circumstances, be a better
proxy decisionmaker than a legal relative. Nor do the statutes provide
any guidelines beyond bloodlines for physicians or courts to follow in
determining who is the best-suited proxy.
Some proxy decisionmaking statutes are painstakingly clear and
forthright. For example, the Georgia statute provides that:
any one of the following persons is authorized and empowered to con-
sent, either orally or otherwise, to any surgical or medical treatment or
procedure not prohibited by law which may be suggested, recom-
mended, prescribed, or directed by a duly licensed physician: (1) Any,
adult, for himself; (2) Any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his
minor child; (3) Any married person, whether an adult or a minor, for
himself and for his spouse; (4) Any person temporarily standing in loco
parentis, whether formally serving or not, for the minor under his care;
and any guardian, for his ward; . . .39
Mississippi's statute is especially thorough and inclusive of different
relatives:
Who may consent to surgical or medical treatment or procedures ...(a) Any adult, for himself.... (b) Any parent.., for his minor child
or for his adult child of unsound mind .... (d) Any married person
... for his spouse of unsound mind .... (j) Any adult, for his minor
brother or sister or for his adult brother or sister of unsound mind.4°
Unlike these two statutes, Idaho's statute does not delineate all the
different blood relatives who may consent on behalf of an incompetent
adult. Instead, Idaho's provision includes a blanket grant of proxy pow-
ers to cover every possible situation:
§ 766.103(3)(a)(1), (4)(a) (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2906.1(b)(2), (e)(3) (Harri-
son Supp. 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. § 671-3(a) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-4303 (1985); IowA
CODE ANN. § 147.137(3) (West 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.53, .55 (West 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 2905(1) (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(9) (West 1989); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-3 (Cum. Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1990);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2808 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.120(2) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90.21.13(a) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54(C) (Anderson Supp. 1988); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.03(a), 6.04(a), 6.05 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-14-5(4) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(c)(3) (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050(4), 7.70.060 (Supp. 1989).
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2904(a) (Harrison 1986).
40. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The informed consent statutes of
Louisiana and Utah also contain'long lists of relatives empowered to give consent for the
incapacitated adult. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.53 (West 1977); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-14-5(4) (1977).
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Consent for the furnishing of ... care ... to any person who is not
then capable of giving such consent... may be given or refused by any
competent parent, spouse, or legal guardian ... unless the patient is a
competent adult who has refused to give such consent .... If no par-
ent, spouse or legal guardian is readily available to do so, then consent
may be given by any competent relative .... 41
Other states' statutes are less clear, but they evince a strong prefer-
ence for allowing next of kin to make medical decisions for an incapaci-
tated adult. For example, North Carolina's statute, ostensibly addressing
only medical liability provides: "No recovery shall be allowed against
any health care provider upon the grounds that the health care treatment
was rendered without the informed consent of ... the patient's spouse,
parent, guardian, nearest relative or other person authorized to give con-
sent for the patient .... -"42 The statute only implies that next of kin are
proper proxies. Protection from liability provides a powerful incentive,
however, for physicians to seek consent from a relative of the patient,
regardless of the nature and closeness of the relationship between the
patient and her relative. Thus, in effect, the statute provides that physi-
cians must obtain consent from relatives of the patient when the patient
is unable to consent. The statute perpetuates a bias in favor of legal rela-
tives without consideration of other factors that would better evaluate a
proxy decisionmaker's qualifications.
Finally, several states have cryptic statutes that are equivocal about
who should make decisions for incapacitated patients. For example,
Minnesota's statutory reference to proxy decisionmaking provides: "In
cases where it is medically inadvisable [to give the information to the
patient] the information shall be given to the patient's guardian or other
person designated by the patient as a representative. '43 Similarly, Ohio's
statute provides that: "[I]f the patient ... lacks legal capacity to consent,
[consent may be given] by a person who has legal authority to consent on
behalf of such patient. . . ."44 Statutes such as these most likely mean
either that the hospital personnel will look to tradition and, conse-
quently, the patient's next of kin, or that a judge will make the final
decision using common law, which usually favors blood relatives. While
laudable for not specifically preferring legal relatives to the exclusion of
other loved ones, the end result probably will be the same as if the stat-
41. IDAHO CODE § 39-4303(a), (b) (1985) (emphasis added).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a) (1985).
43. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(9) (West 1989).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54(C) (Anderson Supp. 1988). Arkansas, Florida,
Kentucky, Iowa, Nevada, Washington, and Vermont are similarly vague about exactly who is
supposed to act for the incompetent patient. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(A), (B)
(1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 7 66.103(3)(a)(1), (4)(a) (West Supp. 1989); IOwA CODE ANN.
§ 147.137(3) (West 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320(1) (Baldwin 1988); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41A-120(.2) (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(c)(3) (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.70.060 (Supp. 1989).
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utes did note such a preference. Indefinite statutes also result in confu-
sion because no one can know in advance where she stands or what her
rights, if any, are. Statutes giving a clear preference for parents and
other legal relatives to act as the decisionmakers at least provide some
warning to people who, if they became incapacitated, would prefer some-
one other than a legal relative to make decisions for them. The warning
may allow them to try to make other arrangements.
No state explicitly includes close friends or lovers as appropriate
surrogate decisionmakers, or suggests that they may be people who, be-
cause of their intimate relationships with the incompetent adult and their
knowledge of the patient's preference regarding treatment, shotfld be
consulted about treatment procedures. There seems to be an assumption
behind these statutes that only legal family members know the incompe-
tent person's feelings and preferences about treatment, are able to make
valid decisions on the patient's behalf, or truly have the patient's best
interests at heart.
B. Proxy Decisionmaking Cases
The common law of many states refers, however obliquely,45 to a
doctor's duty to obtain consent from a legal relative when nonemergency
medical decisions must be made for an incapacitated patient.46 Some
cases, like some statutes, merely acknowledge that a person can give nec-
essary medical consent for an incompetent patient, without specifying
who the person may be. For example, a Kansas decision states, "[I]f the
patient is incompetent the consent must be obtained from someone le-
gally authorized to give it for him."'47 This case leaves open the question
of who that person might be, or how the proxy decisionmaker should be
chosen. Other similar cases simply specify that a "near relative" should
45. See, e.g., Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453, 458 (Alaska 1964) (Medical expert testi-
fied that he would "also speak to the family when in his judgment the patient's condition
warranted.").
46. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir. 1970); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 243-44, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188,
198-99, 473 P.2d 116, 122-23 (1970); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, 205
Kan. 292, 298, 469 P.2d 330, 336 (1970); Wilson v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478, 479-80 (Ky.
1964); Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289, 1300 (La. Ct. App. 1977);
Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 701 n.14 (Minn. 1977); In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616,
623-34, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 630-31 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355,
360, 90 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1956); Murray v. VanDevander, 522 P.2d 302, 304 (Okla. Ct. App.
1974); Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 306, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (1967).
47. Younts, 205 Kan. at 298, 469 P.2d at 336; see also Dunham v. Wright, 302 F. Supp.
1108, 1109 (M.D. Pa. 1969) (doctor should get consent for treatment of incompetent patient
from "someone legally authorized to give it for him"), aff'd, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970).
April 1990]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
give consent if the patient is unable.48 Thus, individual trial judges have
great discretion to resolve disputes.
Some courts, however, stress that decisions about proxy consent to
medical treatment should be made in the private familial sphere rather
than in the courtroom. In one case, In re Nemser, 49 the court scolded
the parties in holding that a judicial determination was unwarranted.
The case involved a disagreement among three adult sons over the pro-
posed amputation of their mother's foot. The court stated:
Is the court to be made the arbiter in all family disputes as to the
wisdom or necessity of medical treatment, or is that, in reality a medi-
cal problem to be resolved by the physician, his patient, where possi-
ble, and the family, if necessary? Certainly, the courtroom is not the
proper forum .... If there is no ... emergency or urgency, then the
Court should not, in effect, be placed in the position of making what
should be a private or family determination-a medical decision, obvi-
ously not a legal one. 50
Many cases about who is to decide questions of medical treatment
for an incompetent adult involve the discontinuance of life-sustaining
treatment, certainly the most extreme example of proxy decisionmaking.
In In re L.H.R., 51 a case involving a terminally ill child, the court held
that the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution gives adult
patients the right to refuse treatment, and that this right is not lost be-
cause of youth or incompetency. The court concluded that because of
the value society places on the family, "the decision whether to end the
dying process is a personal decision for family members or those who
bear a legal responsibility for the patient."152 The court spontaneously
took "this opportunity to extend our holding to . . . incompetent adult
patient[s].... [T]he family of the adult or the legal guardian may make
the decision to terminate life-support systems without prior judicial ap-
proval or consultation of an ethics committee. '53 If courts believe that as
48. Wilson, 379 S.W.2d at 479-80; see also Percle, 349 So. 2d at 1300 (quoting Canter-
bury, 464 F.2d at 789) ("[D]isclosure [is required] to a close relative with a view to securing
consent to the proposed treatment .. "); Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d at 701 n. 14 ("In a situation in
which nondisclosure is warranted, the physician should seek consent from a close relative.");
Grannum, 70 Wash. 2d at 306, 422 P.2d at 814 ("[lIn surgical cases, consent to such procedure
must be obtained from either the patient, or, if the patient is under some disability, from a near
relative capable of giving consent.").
49. 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
50. Id. at 623-24, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
51. 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984).
52. Id. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 723.
53. Id. at 447, 321 S.E.2d at 723. See also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984), which states:
We hold that the right of a patient, who is in an irreversibly comatose and essentially
vegetative state to refuse extraordinary life-sustaining measures, may be exercised
either by his or her close family members or by a guardian of the person of the
patient appointed by the court. If there are close family members such as the pa-
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weighty a decision as discontinuing life-support systems should be left to
blood relatives without court intervention,5 4 there is little question that
courts also would leave less serious questions to the legal family to de-
cide, without judicial oversight.
One case seems to stand for an increased judicial role in life and
death decisions. In In re Conservatorship of Torres, 55 the court held that
a judicial order was necessary to discontinue a man's life-support system,
even though the man's only two known relatives and the hospital staff all
agreed that withdrawal of the support was the best course. The holding
suggests that the court believed adjudication was required to protect the
incompetent patient's rights. Yet, in a footnote, the court added that it
did not intend for this opinion to change the common situation of fami-
lies, physicians, and hospitals making decisions to discontinue the life
support of incapacitated adult patients.56 Courts, however, seem to be
best suited to determine who should make decisions for incapacitated
adults on a long-term, nonemergency basis. The role of the courts is to
sift objectively through facts and make just conclusions. Courts also tra-
ditionally have been charged with protecting the weakest elements in so-
ciety, and incompetent adult patients surely are a group in need of
judicial protection. Thus, instead of shying away from such situations, to
protect the rights of patients, courts should enter the fray and make deci-
sions that balance all the interests involved.
One reason courts may favor legal family members as proxy deci-
sionmakers for incapacitated adults is the concern that these relatives
will be held financially responsible for the care and treatment of the pa-
tient. Because the financial resources of these persons are at stake, the
reasoning goes, they should be able to make the medical decisions. As
tient's spouse, adult children, or parents, who are willing to exercise this right on behalf
of the patient, there is no requirement that a guardian be judicially appointed ...
The decision to terminate artificial life supports is a decision that normally should be
made in the patient-doctor- family relationship. Doctors, in consultation with close
family members are in the best position to make these decisions.
Ia at 926 (emphasis added).
54. A concurring justice in Bludworth suggested that a guardian still should be appointed
for an incapacitated adult when the decision of terminating life-sustaining treatment is in-
volved, because a guardian is required in order to make conveyances of the incompetent per-
son's property, and ending life support should be treated as seriously. Id. at 927 (McDonald,
J., concurring).
55. 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
56. "[A]bout 10 life support systems are disconnected weekly in Minnesota. This follows
consultation between the attending doctor and the family with the approval of the hospital
ethics committee. It is not intended by this opinion that a court order is required in such
situations." Id. at 341 n.4; see also In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 636, 639, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120,
122 (1980) (stating, somewhat confusingly, both that "our opinions should not be taken to
establish any requirement of prior judicial approval that would not otherwise exist" and that
"[w]hen a court is properly presented with the legal question, whether treatment may be with-
held, it must decide that question and not delegate it to some private person or group").
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one court blatantly expressed this financial consideration, "where an
adult child is incompetent and has no legally appointed guardian, the
right to consent to medical or surgical treatment resides in the parent
who has the legal responsibility to maintain and support such child
S. 57 While in most jurisdictions parents indeed are held financially
responsible for their incompetent adult offspring who are unable to pay
for needed medical treatment,5 8 parents should not receive correspond-
ing control over treatment decisions unless they also fulfill the two main
goals of proxy decisionmaking, effectuating the patient's own will
through substituted judgment and serving the best interests of the pa-
tient. 9 Power to make decisions for an incompetent patient should not
go hand in hand with control of the pursestrings. Financial liability of
parents for adult offspring is meant to protect society from paying for the
care and treatment of patients, a goal that has nothing to do with the
goals of the law in guardianship and proxy decisionmaking. The law's
utmost concern in this area should be with protecting the rights of the
powerless, with doing what is best for the incompetent person.
The conflict between financial responsibility and the best interests of
the ward is apparent in situations involving the spouses of incompetent
adults. It is an open question whether a financially obligated parent has
more authority to make treatment decisions than the spouse of an incom-
petent adult. If the spouse does not have enough money to pay for the
care and treatment of the incapacitated person and the bills go to the
patient's parents, the logic of the above decisions seems to favor giving
the parents, not the spouse, control over the patient. It is also clear,
57. Ritz v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 436 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), rev. denied, 450 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1984). Others have echoed essentially the same
concern that the one with control of the pocketbook also should control treatment decisions,
but less directly. See, e.g., Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) ("with the concurrence of those who have responsibility for the diagnosis and with
the concurrence of those who have responsibility for the care of the patient, it is not unethical to
discontinue all means of life-prolonging medical treatment") (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL As-
SOCIATION'S COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, WITHHOLDING OR WITH-
DRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT (Mar. 15, 1986)); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga.
439, 446, 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (1984) ("the decision whether to end the dying process is a
personal decision for family members or those who bear a legal responsibility for the patient")
(emphasis added).
58. See Moore, Parents'Support Obligations to Their Adult Children, 19 AKRON L. REV.
183, 184 (1985), for a summary of the cases and statutes providing for such parental obligation
in 30 jurisdictions.
59. Unfortunately, unlike the guardianship cases, supra note 32, none of the informed
consent cases inquire into the wishes of the incompetent patient when delegating the authority
to make decisions for the patient. A patient currently cannot "prevent critical decisions from
being made by a relative whom he considers unreliable" because such veto provisions are "ab-
sent from the statutes and common law precedents authorizing relatives to give substituted
consent." Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 985, 1002 (1984) (authored by Mark Fowler) (emphasis and footnote omitted).
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however, that "the courts customarily recognize the presumptive priority
of the incapacitated [patient's spouse] as a substitute decisionmaker, ' 60
apparently without regard to the spouse's financial strength. Thus, finan-
cial responsibility as a rationale for selecting proxy decisionmakers is
unsatisfactory.
In sum, there are no clear judicial guidelines for determining who
should make decisions for an incapacitated patient, perhaps because of
the courts' favoritism toward family members. The cases announce that
the decisionmaker should be a "near relative," without suggesting how to
define that term, how to resolve disputes between relatives or between
relatives and other concerned individuals, or how to ascertain and imple-
ment the wishes of the incapacitated patient herself. The case law does
nothing but uphold the age-old custom of obtaining consent from legal
family members, which hospitals continue to do largely without resorting
to the courts. 61 Medical professionals are left to sort out disputes among
family members and among the incapacitated patient's family members
and significant others, without guidance and with virtually unlimited dis-
cretion. If an affected party or a doctor fearing liability does turn to the
courts for resolution of the sensitive and important question of who
should be the substitute decisionmaker, the courts may admonish them
and declare that the question is not worthy of judicial consideration. 62
III. Guardianship
Guardianship is a formalized method of appointing a proxy deci-
sionmaker for an incapacitated person. While courts only become in-
volved in other types of proxy decisionmaking if a dispute arises, no one
can become a guardian without court approval. Although courts admin-
ister guardianship proceedings, the results almost always are identical to
less formal proxy decisionmaking because guardianship statutes and
cases also favor appointment of a legal relative.
60. Comment, supra note 28, at 560 (footnote omitted); see also Corbett v. D'Alessandro,
487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (in consultation with doctors, husband could
have vegetative wife's nasogastric tube removed); Steele v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187, 199 (Mo.
1959) (doctor should have obtained consent from husband of patient for necessary post-opera-
tive treatment because the patient was too groggy to be treated as competent); Annotation,
Priority and Preference in Appointment of Conservator or Guardian for an Incompetent, 65
A.L.R.3d 991, 1018 (1975) ("the spouse of an incompetent is generally preferred over others as
guardian, whether of the person, or of the estate, or of both, of the incompetent"). Spouses
also are usually the first statutorily suggested proxy decisionmakers. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 39-42.
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
62. See In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 623-24, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966). But see John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984) (even though normally treatment decisions should be left to the family and doctors to
make, "the courts... are always open to hear these matters if request is made by the family,
guardian, physician, or hospital").
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The question of who serves as guardian is even more critical, how-
ever, because guardians obtain greater power over the incapacitated
adult's life than a proxy decisionmaker. Although a proxy deci-
sionmaker can make the ultimate decision to discontinue life support, 63
his decisions are limited to medical questions. A guardian can make all
of the same medical decisions, but also can decide how and where the
ward lives, who the ward may see, and almost every other detail of the
ward's life. For these reasons, guardianship of unmarried adults deserves
close scrutiny.
A. Guardianship Statutes
Appointing a guardian is a formal, legalistic process begun when a
petition is filed by any interested party. 64 Notice of a hearing is served
personally on the proposed ward and other interested parties, such as the
spouse and parents of the proposed ward.65 The alleged incompetent
person's personal autonomy and liberties are at stake in the proceeding as
well as control over virtually all aspects of the ward's life. 66
Every state has a statute authorizing the appointment of a guardian
for incapacitated individuals. 67 The statutes vary from being very com-
63. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.105(a) (1985); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1820 (West
1981). This person can be almost anyone. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.105(a) ([a]ny per-
son may petition.., for.., a guardian for oneself or for another person"); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.541 (West Supp. 1980) ("[a]ny person may petition for the appointment of a guardian or
conservator or for a protective order for any other person believed to be subject to guardian-
ship or conservatorship"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 851 (West Supp. 1990) ("any relative
or friend" may petition for a guardianship for the incompetent person).
65. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-309(2) (1978).
66. As one author stated: "A decision that finds guardianship proper also empowers the
guardian to make decisions concerning day-to-day matters, such as where the ward will live
and with whom, what medical treatment the ward will have, and how the ward's money will
be spent." Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardianship
for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1979).
67. See ALA. CODE § 26-2A-102 (Supp. 1989); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.095, 13.26.165
(1985); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5301 to -5315, 36-547 (1975 & Supp. 1989); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28-65-101 to -603 (1987 & Supp. 1989); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1500-1605 (West
1981 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-101 to -502 (1973 & Supp. 1979); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-70 to -77b (West 1958 & Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3914 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 744.101 to .531 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-601 to -613 (Supp. 1980); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:5-101 to 5-502 (1985 & Supp.
1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-101 to -603 (1979 & Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
1 la-1 to -23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-1 to -13 (Burns 1989); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 633.552 to .561 (West 1964 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3001 to -
3038 (1983 & Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 387.500-.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1984 & Cum. Supp. 1988); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 389-426 (West 1952 & Supp. 1989); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-301 to -313 (1981 & Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. §§ 13-101 to -806 (1974 & Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 201, §§ 6-15 (1981 & Supp.
1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.401 to .499, 700.8 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); MINN.
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plex to simply acknowledging that a guardian may be appointed for some
people under some circumstances.
(1) The Uniform Probate Code Model
Several states base their guardianship statutes on the Uniform Pro-
bate Code (UPC), which gives family members the predominant role in
guardianship. Most of the statutes that are not patterned after the model
code agree on this role of the family as well. Several states68 define inca-
pacity using language from the UPC, which defines an incapacitated per-
son as "any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of
drugs, chronic intoxication, or other causes (except minority) to the ex-
tent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or com-
municate responsible decisions concerning his person."'69
STAT. ANN. §§ 525.539 to .614 (West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-13-121 to -151
(1972 & Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 475.010 to .370 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 72-5-101 to -502 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2601 to -2672 (1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 159.013 to .215 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 464-A:l to :44
(1983 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-24 to -66 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-5-101 to 5-502 (1989); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw 78.01 to .31 (McKinney 1988); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 35A-1 101 to -1294 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-26-01 to -30-05 (1976 &
Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2111.01 to .48 (Anderson 1976 & Supp. 1988); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 851 to 859 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.003 to
.227 (1983); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5501 to 5525 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1989); R.I.
GEN. LAws §§ 33-15-1 to -45 (1984 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE §§ 44-23-710 to -820 (1985 &
Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 30-26-1 to -7 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-
101 to -7-105 (1984 & Supp. 1989); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 108-127A (Vernon 1980 &
Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-101 to -502 (1978 & Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, §§ 3060-3096 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-128.01 to 37.1-147 (1984 & Supp. 1989);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 11.88.005 to .150 (1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-11-1 to -11-5
(1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 880.01 to .39 (West Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. §§ 3-2-101 to -201
(1985).
68. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-5101(1) (Supp. 1989); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-14-101
(1987); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-101(a) (Supp. 1988); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 72-5-101(1)
(1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2601(1) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-101(F) (1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01(2) (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(18) (Supp. 1986).
69. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-101(1) (1969). One author criticized the lack of guidelines in
the model code, stating as follows:
Indeed, under this formula, there is no requirement that an allegedly in-
capacited [sic] person perform any acts of incompetence. The standard instead indi-
cates that one's status, as elderly, physically disabled, mentally ill, or socially deviant,
is the key element. Whether an individual is incapable, lacks understanding, or is
unable to make proper decisions will depend on the subjective interpretations of the
decisionmaker.
Mitchell, supra note 66, at 1421. Similarly, another author noted of California's guardianship
provision, "that guardians are, in fact, not appointed 'for almost any unsuccessful person' can
be credited only to the restrained exercise of sound judicial discretion." Pickering, Limitations
on Individual Rights in California Incompetency Proceedings, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 457, 484-
85 (1974).
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Fourteen states have adopted substantially the UPC definition of
guardianship. 70 The UPC contains a section entitled, "Who May Be
Guardian; Priorities," which provides:
(a) Any competent person or a suitable institution may be ap-
pointed guardian of an incapacitated person.
(b) Persons who are not disqualified have priority for appoint-
ment as guardian in the following order:
(1) the spouse of the incapacitated person;
(2) an adult child of the incapacitated person;
(3) a parent of the incapacitated person, including a person
nominated by will or other writing signed by a deceased parent;
(4) any relative of the incapacitated person with whom he
has resided for more than 6 months prior to the filing of the
petition;
(5) a person nominated by the person who is caring for him
or paying benefits to him.71
Several states have enacted similar provisions for choosing a guard-
ian, giving the same enumerated preference for those closely related to
the incapacitated person. Some of these statutes use the UPC model only
as a base and add other important provisions that consider the prefer-
ences of the ward herself. For example, Alabama adds a provision for
preferential appointment of the nominee of the incapacitated person as
long as the nomination was made in a durable power of attorney, and
"[u]nless lack of qualification or other good cause dictates the con-
trary."'72 Alabama's statute also contains, after a UPC-like list of prefer-
ences, a clause giving the court discretion to choose the guardian if two
candidates are of equal priority73 on the list, or if appointment of some-
one of lower priority or even no priority is in the best interests of the
ward. 74 Colorado adds as the second choice for guardian on the enumer-
ation of preferences "[a] person nominated by the incapacitated person in
writing prior to his incapacity. ' 75 This provision is a much less formal
means of considering the incompetent person's preference than requiring
that the wish be expressed in a durable power of attorney, as Alabama's
statute requires. Neither statute, however, sufficiently furthers the pref-
70. ALA. CODE §§ 26-2-40, 26-2-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.005(1) (1972); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5301 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-304 (1987 & Supp. 1989);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-101(2) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-101(a) (1979); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18(a), § 1-201(16) (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.443 (1980 & Supp. 1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 91-5-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAr. § 30-2601(1) (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32-5-101 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-04 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 126.003
(1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(18) (1978 & Supp. 1986).
71. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-311 (1969).
72. ALA. CODE § 26-2A-104(b) (Supp. 1989).
73. For example, if both parents or two siblings of a patient requested appointment as
guardian, the court would have discretion to choose.
74. ALA. CODE § 26-2A-104(d) (Supp. 1989).
75. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-311(b) (1987).
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erences of the ward because few adults execute documents stating such
preferences.
Both Alaska and Montana have incorporated significant deviations
from the UPC model into their respective guardianship statutes. Alaska
expresses a clear preference for abiding by the wishes of the incompetent
person. One section of the statute provides: "If it is necessary to appoint
a guardian, the court shall consider the ward's preference." '76 In its list
of preferences for guardian, the Alaska statute includes, as the first
choice, "[the nominee of] the incapacitated person, if at the time of the
nomination the incapacitated person had the capacity to make a reason-
ably intelligent choice."' 77 Finally, Alaska adds another choice to the list
of potential guardians: "a relative or friend who has demonstrated a sin-
cere, longstanding interest in the welfare of the incapacitated person. ",78
Unfortunately, this option is last on the prioritized list. Another section,
however, adds that the priorities are - not binding and that the court
should select the best qualified individual. 79 Thus, one can hope that the
court will exercise its discretion to follow the likely wishes of the ward.
(2) Non-Uniform Probate Code States
A number of states have guardianship statutes that are not based
substantially upon the UPC. The only traits these statutes have in com-
mon are their diversity and lack of concern for the ward's preferences.
The methods for choosing a guardian exemplify the variety, ranging from
those providing no guidance to the courts to those spelling out a clear,
preference for appointing family members as guardians.
Many of these states do not enumerate any priorities for the court to
follow in appointing a guardian. Some offer no guidance at all. For ex-
ample, New Hampshire's statute provides that "[a]ny competent person
who agrees to so serve may be appointed guardian of the person and
estate, or the person, or the estate."' 0 Missouri's statute is similar: "any
adult person may be appointed" guardian.81 Three states add one qualifi-
76. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.113(g) (1985).
77. Id. § 13.26.145(d)(1). Montana's statute also adds, as first priority, the nominee of
the incompetent person, "if the court specifically finds that at the time of the nomination the
incapacitated person had the capacity to make a reasonably intelligent choice." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-5-312(2)(a) (1989).
78. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145(d)(5) (1985) (emphasis added). Montana's statute uses
identical language. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-312(2)(f) (1989).
79. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145(e) (1985); accord MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-312(3)
(1989).
80. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:10 (Supp. 1988).
81. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.055 1.(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Several other states express
no statutory preferences for appointments of guardians: California (although CAL. PROB.
CODE § 1812 does enumerate priorities to be used in appointing a conservator), Connecticut,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
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cation to this broad grant of discretion to the court by requiring that the
court consider the wishes of the incompetent person. 82
Other states have enacted statutes that go considerably further in
defining the court's options for appointing guardians for incapacitated
persons. These statutes range from those merely stating that the court
shall have due regard for "relationship by blood or marriage to the per-
son for whom the guardianship is sought, ' 83 to those specifying persons
the court should consider appointing as guardian, and everything in
between.
For example, some states' statutes only imply a predominant role
for legal relatives to play in the guardianship proceedings. Ohio's statute
provides that "[t]he application of the guardian of an incompetent shall
contain . . . [the] [n]ame, degree of kinship, age, and address of next of
kin,"84 and that "notice shall be served... [u]pon the next of kin of the
person for whom appointment is sought known to reside in the county in
which application is made."' 85 Thus, it seems evident that the state in-
tends for the legal relatives of the incapacitated person to be involved in
the guardianship proceedings, and presumably to serve as guardian, yet
the statute never explicitly states such a preference.86 Four other states
treat the involvement of legal relatives in a similar, implicit fashion. 87
On the other hand, several states specify who is to be appointed
guardian for an incompetent adult. Florida's statute treats the wishes of
the incompetent person and the interests of her family equally. The stat-
ute provides that any qualified person can serve as guardian "whether
82. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, Paras. 1 la-12(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 387.600(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-128.1(A)
(Supp. 1989). Kentucky further qualifies the court's discretion in a later section, stating that
the court shall give preference to people with these qualifications: "(1) kinship to the [incapac-
itated person]; (2) [e]ducation and business experience of the applicant; [and] (3) [c]apability to
handle financial affairs." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.605.
83. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-65-204(b)(4) (1987). For other similar provisions, see IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-3-5-4(5) (Burns 1989) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.061.4 (1989).
84. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.03(B) (Anderson 1976) (emphasis added).
85. Id. § 2111.04(B)(2).
86. Only once does the statute specifically state that a legal relative should serve as guard-
ian, and even then it is in equivocal fashion rather than a mandate. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2111.11 provides that the incompetent person's spouse may be appointed guardian "if it is
made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that such spouse is competent to discharge the
duties of such appointment."
87. Maine and West Virginia both provide that the incompetent person's spouse or adult
next of kin receive notice of the guardianship hearing. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 5-309(a) (1964 & Supp. 1989) (also providing for notice to "an adult friend" if no adult
relatives are available); W. VA. CODE § 27-11-1(b) (1986). And Massachusetts' statute pro-
vides that a parent or two or more relatives or friends or agencies may file a petition for
guardianship. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 201, § 6 (1981 & Supp. 1989). Oklahoma's provision is
similar. "Any relative or friend may petition for guardianship" and then the "court shall
cause notice to be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person and.., to some known
near relative." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 851 (West Supp. 1990).
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related to the ward or not,"881 but that the court shall give consideration
to both "next of kin" 89 and the incompetent person's "wishes." 90 Texas'
statute also is detailed and implies that legal relatives possess a right to be
named guardian for an incompetent family member. The statute
provides:
(1) If [the incompetent] has a spouse who is not disqualified, such
spouse shall be entitled to the guardianship in preference to any other
person.
(2) If there be no qualified spouse, the nearest of kin to such person,
who is not disqualified, or in case of refusal by such spouse or nearest
of kin to serve, then any other qualified person shall be entitled to the
guardianship.
(3) Where two or more persons are equally entitled, [one shall be cho-
sen according to the best interests of the ward]. 91
Maryland's code also strongly favors family members, listing many
blood relatives as having priority. The code also includes the boilerplate
"heirs if [the incapacitated person] were dead" to the list.92 Arkansas'
statute is a little less rigid in its preference for family members, stating
only that the court shall have due regard for any requests from the
spouse of the incapacitated person and for "[t]he relationship by blood or
marriage to the person for whom guardianship is sought."' 93 In addition,
the statute adds that the "court shall take into consideration any request
made by the incapacitated person concerning his preference regarding
the person to be appointed guardian." '94
Some statutes direct the court to consider more than just blood and
legal ties when choosing a guardian. For example, Georgia's statute in-
cludes the following in the list of preferences for guardians:
(6) A relative or other person who has provided care for the incapaci-
tated person and with whom the incapacitated person has resided for a
significant period prior to the time of application; and
(7) Other persons, such as relatives; persons nominated by a spouse,
adult child, parent, or guardian; or private persons providing income or
other care to the incapacitated person. 95
Two other states have statutes that seem concerned with respecting
the autonomy of the incapacitated person. Kansas includes in its statute
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.312(1) (West 1986).
89. Id. § 744.312(2). Florida's guardianship statute also contains a provision that few
other states attempted-it gives a definition of next of kin. "'Next of kin' means those persons
who would be heirs at law of the ward or alleged incompetent if such person were deceased
and includes lineal descendants of such ward or alleged incompetent person." Id.
§ 744.102(16).
90. Id. § 744.312(3).
91. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 109(c) (Vernon 1980) (emphasis added).
92. MD. EsT. & TRusTs CODE ANN. § 13-707(a)(6) (Supp. 1989).
93. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-65-204(b)(4) (1987).
94. Id. § 28-65-204(c).
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-602(c) (1989) (emphasis added).
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a provision for appointing a guardian for an adherent to faith healing.
The statute states that "the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the
appointment of a person as guardian who is sympathetic to and will sup-
port such system of healing."'96 This consideration for the beliefs and
choices of the ward should be expanded to encourage the preservation of
other lifestyle choices. Minnesota evinces concern for the incapacitated
person's wishes by specifying factors the court should consider to deter-
mine which guardian would best serve the interests of the incapacitated
person. The statute directs the court to consider:
(1) the reasonable preference of the ward or conservatee, if the court
determines the ward or conservatee has sufficient capacity to express a
preference;
(2) the interaction between the proposed guardian or conservator and
the ward or conservatee; and
(3) the interest and commitment of the proposed guardian or conser-
vator in promoting the welfare of the ward or conservatee and the pro-
posed guardian's or conservator's ability to maintain a current
understanding of the ward's or conservatee's physical and mental sta-
tus and needs....
Kinship is not a conclusive factor in determining the best inter-
ests of the ward or conservatee but it should be considered to the ex-
tent that it is relevant to the other factors contained in this
subdivision. 97
Although this statute lists several important factors, it fails to con-
sider the ward's preferences expressed before incapacity. Thus, the stat-
ute does not encourage courts to preserve the ward's lifestyle by using
substituted judgment. The statute instead advocates a somewhat enlight-
ened paternalism. The strong preference for family is the common
thread running through most of the guardianship statutes, whether they
are UPC-model statutes or not. There are also other similarities. For
example, some of the guardianship codes seem to have a great interest in
economics and financial matters. The UPC includes in the enumeration
of preferred guardians, "a person nominated by the person who is caring
for him or paying benefits to him."98 Kentucky's statute states that in
appointing a guardian the court shall consider "kinship" to the incapaci-
tated person plus the "[e]ducation and business experience of the appli-
cant" and his or her capability to handle financial affairs. 99 Delaware
includes creditors and debtors in its list of people to be preferred as
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3014(a)(2)(c) (Supp. 1987).
97. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.539(7) (West Supp. 1990).
98. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-311(5) (1969). The UPC-model states have incorporated this
into their lists of preferences as well.
99. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.605 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); see also IND. CODE
ANN. § 29-3-5-4 (Burns 1989) (court shall have "due regard to ... [t]he best interest of the
incapacitated person ... and the property of the incapacitated person.")
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guardians, right after parents, siblings, spouses, adult children, and next
of kin. 00
Most guardianship statutes, whether based on the UPC or not, en-
courage courts to appoint a legal family member of the ward as guardian.
Little attention is paid to the goal of guardianship law, preserving the
self-determination of the ward. Incompetent adult wards are, for the
most part, treated as minors totally dependent on legal family members.
The statutes do not encourage examination of the necessity or propriety
of family involvement, unquestioningly accepting the preferability of
family. Unfortunately, the interests of incompetent adults have not fared
any better at the hands of judges.
B. Guardianship Cases
Sometimes a dispute,10' due process concerns, or fears of liability
compel a doctor, family member, or other concerned individual to turn
to the courts and file a petition for legal guardianship for the incompetent
patient. This procedure is the legally valid route of proxy decisionmak-
ing.10 2 In fact, one court has assumed that only a court-appointed guard-
ian can give valid consent for an incapacitated adult patient.103
Even when a legal guardian is appointed, chances are good that a
member of the incompetent person's legal family still will make the deci-
sions, just as if the less formal proxy appointment method had been used.
This situation occurs because "[p]reference is given to family mem-
bers"'14 to serve as legal guardians, and "consanguinity ... will not be
disregarded except upon strong grounds" when appointing a guardian. 105
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914(a) (1979).
101. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), is an exam-
ple. For a time just after Sharon's incapacitating accident, both her legal family and her part-
ner, Karen, consulted with doctors and expressed opinions about treatments. Only after
Sharon's parents and Karen began to disagree and Karen's right to see Sharon was threatened
did anyone think of starting the legal guardianship process.
102. See supra note 19.
103. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 624 (Northampton Cty. 1973). Another court
defended the requirement of a court order before life support systems could be removed from a
patient in a vegetative state, regardless of the fact that the patient's immediate legal family
members all agreed to discontinue the systems. The court stated that "the court system pro-
vides the only mechanism which can protect the interest of the doctor, the hospital, the pa-
tient, the family and the state, which can objectively weigh the competing interests in an
emotionally charged situation, and which can insulate the participants from civil and criminal
liability." Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 396, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052
(1984).
104. In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 186, 372 A.2d 360, 370 (1977).
105. In re Guardianship of Hampson's Estate, 190 Or. 279, 285, 223 P.2d 1039, 1042
(1950); see also In re Weisman, 112 A.D.2d 871, 872, 493 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (court must appoint family member or their nominee as guardian, unless they are
unqualified).
April 1990]
Many guardianship cases reflect the deeply entrenched presumption10 6
that next of kin is best suited to serve as guardian. 107 One case actually
states that the nearest relative possesses a right to be appointed
guardian. 108
Another case particularly illustrates how far courts will go to have a
relative appointed guardian to make decisions for a patient. 10 9 In this
case, the physicians of an elderly patient petitioned the court for authori-
zation of a life-saving amputation. 110 Although the patient had con-
sented to the operation, "' his doctors were concerned about the validity
of this consent because they believed the patient incompetent to make
health decisions and because he had previously told relatives that he did
not want the operation. 12 The patient's only close relative, both in
terms of consanguinity and personal relationship, was his sister, and she
refused to consent to the operation.' '3 The court then located a niece of
the patient, and, over the telephone, appointed her guardian and ob-
tained her consent to perform the amputation. 114 This case also illus-
trates the tension between substituted judgment and best interests
standards. If the court had stood in the patient's position and done as he
would have done, it probably would have refused permission for the op-
eration. By following the doctor's recommendation, the court did what
it must have thought was for the patient's own good, regardless of what
he wanted. Thus, one can see how the best interests standard allows
courts to contradict a person's expressed wishes. The result may be
worse than paternalism, amounting instead to a patronizing abuse of
power.
106. "It appears that kinship and familial ties are regarded by the courts with particular
partiality when they find it necessary to select a guardian, whether of the person, or of the
estate, or of both, for an incompetent, and that such will not be disregarded except upon strong
grounds .... " Annotation, supra note 60, at 998; see also supra note 26.
107. See Rathbun v. Rimmerman, 6 II1. App. 2d 101, 126 N.E.2d 856 (1955); In re Dietz,
247 A.D. 366, 287 N.Y.S. 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936); In re Guardianship of Hampson's Es-
tate, 190 Or. 279, 223 P.2d 1039 (1950). Modern cases still demonstrate a preference for
appointing legal family members. See Kicherer v. Kicherer, 400 A.2d 1097 (Md. 1979); In re
Tepen, 599 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Roots v. Reid, 555 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); In re Steinberg, 121 A.D.2d 872, 503 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); In re Weis-
man, 112 A.D.2d 871, 493 N.Y.S.2d 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
108. "The nearest relative thus has an absolute right to the appointment [as guardian] if
unobjectionable." Kelley v. Kelley, 129 Ga. App. 257, 259, 199 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1973) (cita-
tions omitted).
109. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Center v. Levitt, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d
356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
110. Id. at 397. 342 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 396, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
114. Id. at 399, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61.
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The quintessential guardianship case, In re Quinlan, 115 illustrates
both the preference for family members to act as guardians and the vast
powers a guardian possesses. In Quinlan, the court authorized the pa-
tient's father, as her guardian, to use substituted judgment-that is, to
stand in her place, and decide whether she would have wanted her life-
support system disconnected. 1 6 According to the court, the father's
strong familial bond with his daughter qualified him to be the guardian
and to make this decision.1 7 The court also stated that treatment ques-
tions should be left to the doctors and the family of the patient.118
There are, however, exceptions to the common-law preference for
appointing family members as guardians for incompetent patients. For
one, courts often are required to follow the principle that the appoint-
ment must serve the best interests of the incompetent person, 1 9 and this
consideration may require appointing someone who is not a blood
relative. 120
Courts sometimes pass over family members for an unrelated person
when conflicts of interest or disagreements1 21 between the incapacitated
person and her relatives are apparent. One court declared that, while
blood relatives are entitled to a favorable presumption, the appointment
of someone outside the legal family "is in the best interests of the incom-
petent where the record discloses dissension in the family, the adverse
interests of the relatives and the incompetent, the lack of business ability
115. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
116. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
117. Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 664.
118. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
119. Boylan v. Kohn, 172 Ala. 275, 278, 55 So. 127, 128 (1911); Guardianship of Brown,
16 Cal. 3d 326, 334-35, 546 P.2d 298, 303-04, 128 Cal. Rptr. 10, 15-16 (1976); In re Estate of
Bennett, 122 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760, 461 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1984); In re Andrews, 125 A.D. 457,
465, 109 N.Y.S. 831, 837, rev'd on other grounds, 192 N.Y. 514, 85 N.E. 699 (1908).
120. See, eg., Patterson v. Cook, 288 S.C. 220, 221, 341 S.E.2d 782, 782 (1986), which
stated:
"[T]he selection of the committee rests largely in the discretion of the appointing
court, the paramount consideration being the best interests of the incompetent.
While close relatives should be carefully considered as potential appointees, they
need not be appointed if, in its discretion, the court determines that the best interests
of the incompetent require the appointment of someone else." (Citations omitted.)
121. Cases setting forth potential areas of conflict within a family include: Maben v.
Rankin, 55 Cal. 2d 139, 142, 358 P.2d 681, 682, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 354 (1961) (husband's
ulterior motives for committing wife); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp.
127, 133, 482 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (financial concerns); In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 640 n.3, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 n.3 (1980) (financial concerns); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 339, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (1985) (family members' concern with possible inheritance of
incompetent person's estate). Certainly another potential area of conflict within a family is
differing religious beliefs. "Consider the different attitudes toward medical care held by a Je-
hovah's Witness, a right-to-life advocate, and a euthanasiast. A patient might very well prefer
to have his health care decision made by a nonrelative who shares these convictions, rather
than by a spouse or next-of-kin who does not." Note, supra note 59, at 1002 n. 115.
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of the relative or any other reason whereby a stranger would best serve
the interest of the incompetent."1 22
Several courts also have acknowledged that the choice of a "close"
relative as guardian is in the best interests of the incapacitated person
only when the word "close" refers to more than consanguinity. "IT]he
ties of blood are important ... only if they bind in love and service."1 23
Another court appointed a neighbor and close friend as guardian of an
incapacitated woman, rather than the woman's daughter, because "per-
sonal enmity" existed between the mother and daughter. 24
In appointing the woman's neighbor rather than her daughter, the
court also gave effect to the woman's wishes as to who should be her
guardian. 25 Other courts have followed the wishes of the incapacitated
person when appointing her guardian. One declared that "the wishes
and desires of the protected person, while certainly not binding upon the
court, should be accorded as much deference as possible."' 126 In one
case, the court refused to appoint a man's daughter as his guardian be-
cause she intended to move the man back to her home in Texas. The
man had moved away because he disliked living conditions there, and the
court acceded to his wishes and appointed someone else. 127 Some courts,
however, have ignored the wishes of the incompetent person, citing that a
court has full discretion to appoint whomever it deems best suited to be
guardian, 128 and that the wishes of the incompetent person are not con-
122. In re West, 13 A.D.2d 599, 600, 212 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961); see
also In re Guardianship of Ward, 42 Haw. 60, 72 (1957) (when next of kin have adverse
interests to those of the incompetent person, the relatives will not be appointed guardian); In
re Scurlock, 90 A.D.2d 552, 455 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (feuding family led to
appointment of nonrelative as guardian); In re Lyon, 52 A.D.2d 847, 382 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1976)
(court justified in not naming son of incompetent patient as guardian because of the son's
indifference to the patient), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1056, 396 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1977); Driscoll v. Jewel,
37 Or. App. 529, 588 P.2d 49 (1978) (friend of incompetent patient was a more suitable guard-
ian than the patient's daughter, because the relationship between the patient and his daughter
had deteriorated).
123. In re Danzig, 23 Misc. 2d 591, 592, 196 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); see
also In re Guardianship of Mignerey, 11 Wash. 2d 42, 118 P.2d 440 (1941) (appointment of
nonrelative proper because incompetent woman did not have a close relationship with her
children).
124. In re Guardianship of Quindt, 396 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
125. Id. at 1218.
126. Driscoll, 37 Or. App. at 533, 588 P.2d at 51. Another court stated: "A man may be
insane so as to be a fit subject for guardianship, and yet have a sensible opinion and strong
feeling upon the question who that guardian shall be. And that opinion and feeling it would be
the duty as well as the pleasure of the court anxiously to consult, as the happiness of the ward
and his restoration to health might depend upon it." Allis v. Morton, 70 Mass. (1 Gray) 63
(1855). Also, courts have revoked the appointment of a guardian because the incompetent
person wanted another to serve as guardian. See In re Weissinger, 720 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986); In re Guardianship of Green, 125 Wash. 570, 572, 216 P. 843, 844 (1923).
127. Guardianship of Mosier, 246 Cal. App. 2d 164, 54 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1966).
128. In re Guardianship of Cassidy, 95 Cal. App. 641, 647, 273 P. 69, 72 (1928); Kutzner
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trolling. 129 These results seem at odds with the goals of the law in proxy
decisionmaking. The courts in such cases have abdicated their responsi-
bility and sacrificed what was truly best for the incompetent patient,
probably for the sake of judicial efficiency.
C. Broad Powers of Guardians
Once appointed, a guardian possesses a great deal of power over the
adult ward, often the "same rights, powers, and duties that a parent has
with respect to an unemancipated minor child" and the "right to custody
of the.., person and the right to establish his ... abode."' 130 The guard-
ian can decide how and where the ward lives, whom the ward may see,
what treatment the ward receives, and even whether the ward continues
to receive life sustainment, such as food and water through a nasogastric
tube. In one case,' 3 ' a young woman's mother, serving as her legally
appointed guardian, petitioned the court for permission to disconnect the
woman's life-support systems, even though the woman herself had never
expressed such a desire. 132 The court held that the guardian could halt
life-sustaining treatment without a prior court order 133 because "these
decisions are best left, wherever possible, to the incompetent patient's
guardian, immediate family and physicians."'' 34 Instead of making the
decision from the patient's point of view, the court held that the guardian
should have used the best interests standard and done what she thought
was best for the patient. 135 The court stated that the wishes of the pa-
tient, even if expressed while incompetent, "must be given strong consid-
eration," but did not require the guardian to follow the patient's
expressed preferences about such treatment. 36
In a case illustrating the broad scope of a guardian's powers and
how these powers can be misused, five sets of parents petitioned for ap-
v. Meyers, 182 Ind. 669, 674, 108 N.E. 115, 117 (1915); see also In re Guardianship of Hill,
196 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ohio Prob. 1963) (incompetent's choice for guardian "shall be appointed
if a suitable person").
129. See, eg., Ahlman v. Wolf, 413 So. 2d 787, 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
130. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-708(b) (Supp. 1989). For examples of other
codes giving the guardian the power to decide where and how the incapacitated person will
live, see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-312(a) (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-603 (Supp. 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 35A-1241 (1987).
131. In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
132. Id. at 550, 747 P.2d at 448.
133. Often, however, the court does require adjudication in the life and death decisions
before the guardian can order the support systems withdrawn or nutrition stopped. "[S]uch
questions of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate investi-
gation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was cre-
ated." Superintendent of BeIchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370
N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977).
134. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 566, 747 P.2d at 456.
135. Id. at 567, 747 P.2d at 457.
136. Id.
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pointment as guardians of their adult children in order to take physical
custody of their offspring, remove the adults from their respective homes,
and have them "deprogrammed."'' 37 The parents were upset because
their adult offspring had joined the Unification Church. The trial judge
granted their petitions, with the surprising statement that he was "leav-
ing it entirely up to the parents.... [T]hese are adults, but as I've said
before, a child is a child even though the parent may be ninety and the
child is sixty.' 38 The court of appeals set aside the guardianship pro-
ceedings, holding that "fundamental rights are at stake,"1 39 including the
young adults' constitutional rights of freedom of association and, per-
haps, of religion. 140
Some states limit the guardian's power to establish the ward's abode
and to have physical custody of the ward if the ward is married. Massa-
chusetts law provides that the "care, custody and education" of a mar-
ried ward ordinarily will be left to the ward's spouse rather than to the
guardian. 141 Ohio goes even further, providing that "[]he marriage of a
ward shall determine the guardianship as to the person but not as to the
estate of the ward."' 142 Florida's statute provides the incapacitated per-
son with the greatest amount of autonomy and respect for lifestyle, re-
gardless of the ward's marital status. The statute provides:
In case of an adult ward, the guardian shall honor the ward's prefer-
ences as to place and standard of living, either as had been expressed or
demonstrated by the ward prior to the determination of his incompe-
tency, or as currently expressed by the ward, insofar as such a request
is reasonable. 143
A guardian can continue to wield tremendous power and control
over the ward even from the grave. In the UPC, many UPC-model
codes, and several other state statutes, the parents or spouse of an incom-
petent person are empowered to make a testamentary appointment of a
guardian for their incompetent relative. 144
Naming a guardian thus is an enormously important decision de-
serving of careful judicial oversight. The court can restrict the power of
a particular guardian in the order appointing the person, or, through pre-
cedent, can require court approval before the exercise of certain pow-
137. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 956-57, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 235 (1977).
138. Trial Transcript at 50, In re Conservatorships of Katz, Underwood, Hovard, Brown,
& Kaplan, Nos. 216-828, 217-040, 217-063 (San Francisco Super. Ct. filed March 24, 1977)
(cited in Mitchell, supra note 66, at 1406).
139. Katz, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 968, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
140. Id. at 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
141. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 201, § 24 (1981).
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.45 (Anderson 1976).
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.361(3) (West 1986).
144. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 5-301, -311(3) (1972); HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:5-301
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.062 (1979).
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ers.1 45 Another check is the ability to appeal the lower court's decisions
of appointment or authorization of the guardian's actions. The standard
of appellate review used, however, is whether or not the trial court
abused its discretion. 146 This standard is very difficult to meet because
the lower court has wide discretion in appointing guardians and review-
ing the actions of guardians. 147
As the cases illustrate, the law clings to the presumption that a legal
relative is the proper guardian for an incapacitated adult. This presump-
tion usually prevails even in cases in which the "closest" relative is dis-
tant in both consanguinity and relationship with the ward. Some courts
have ignored the preference for family when the incapacitated adult
clearly prefers someone else, or when conflict exists between the adult
and her legal relatives. The trial court is vested with so much discretion
to appoint a guardian that whether the court adheres to tradition or con-
siders other relevant factors is largely a matter of chance, depending on
the individual judge involved. Similarly, once the guardian is appointed,
whether he arbitrarily lays down rules controlling every aspect of the
ward's life or respects the ward's wishes and makes decisions judiciously
is solely for the guardian to decide. The trial court usually leaves the
extent of the guardian's power to the guardian, vesting the guardian with
full discretion to act as he pleases.' 48
D. In re Guardianship of Kowalski
The decision in In re Guardianship of Kowalski 149 strongly affirmed
the role of legal family members as guardians, with the power to control
all aspects of the incompetent person's life in disregard of the expressed
wishes of the incapacitated relative. The court did so by employing the
best interests standard and ignoring the patient's choices and desires. In
145. See, e.g., In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 559, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 (1982) (guardian
does not have authority to have ward sterilized); Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 277-78, 385
N.E.2d 995, 999 (1979) (guardian cannot admit ward to mental facility unless court finds such
action is in the ward's best interests); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380-81, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 275 (guardian cannot terminate son's life-prolonging blood transfusions),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
146. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (citing In re Guardianship of Dahmen, 192 Minn. 407, 256 N.W. 891 (1934); Schimdt v.
Hebeisen, 347 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
147. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
148. Of course, this discretionary power usually is accompanied by the admonishment to
act only in the best interests of the ward. The limitation is, however, largely illusory. The
guardian can justify almost any action within these loose- boundaries, and the trial court's
review of whether the guardian exceeded the limitation, like appellate review of a trial court's
appointment decision, is not stringent.
149. 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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the process, the court precluded any involvement of other loved ones of
Sharon Kowalski, including her lover of four years, Karen Thompson.
Before the court, Karen Thompson argued that as Sharon Kowal-
ski's de facto spouse, she was best suited to fulfill the fiduciary role as
Sharon's guardian. Thompson cited the prohibition against spousal testi-
mony' 50 and analogized that a quasi-spousal relationship is a strong, con-
fidential relationship deserving of legal recognition and protection as is
the bond between legally recognized spouses.
Sharon Kowalski's father'countered by arguing that "unconditional
parental love for his daughter" supported his appointment as guard-
ian.151 The court agreed with Donald Kowalski, stating, "Thompson
fails to acknowledge the strong confidential relationship which exists be-
tween parent and child. That relationship is presumably even stronger
when the child has been incapacitated to a four- to six-year-old mental
ability."' 152 The court cited the fact that testimonial prohibition also ap-
plies to minor children and their parents as proof of the existence of this
confidential relationship equal to the spousal relationship. 53 The fact
that Sharon is no longer a minor, however, undermines the court's anal-
ogy. The law does not protect communications between adult children
and their parents, which implies that a relationship deserving of legal
protection does not necessarily exist between them.
One could read the court's language to suggest not only that family
members are preferable legal guardians, but that parents are better suited
to serve as guardians than the spouse of the incapacitated person. 154 Par-
ents apparently are preferred, especially when the incapacitated adult's
mental capacity has been impaired to the level of a child's.
The court also rejected the substituted judgment standard, which
would have given effect to Sharon Kowalski's choices as to both whom
the guardian should be and what subsequent decisions the guardian
could make about her life. Instead, the court utilized the best interests
standard, 55 allowing the court to decide who is the "best" guardian for
Sharon, regardless of whom she would have preferred, and leaving the
guardian to decide what is "best" for Sharon in making subsequent deci-
150. Id. at 864-65.
151. Id. at 865.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. This language flies in the face of legal precedent and statutory preferences, which
usually hold the spouse as the preferred choice over the incapacitated person's parents, espe-
cially when it comes to custody of the ward. See supra notes 71, 91, 141, 142 and accompany-
ing text.
155. The best interests standard requires use of an objective, reasonable person test for
determining what is best for the ward. See supra text accompanying note 31. But the reason-
able, ordinary person probably would not think awarding guardianship to parents of adults
who live away from their parents' home is better than appointing someone the adult has cho-
sen as a partner, lives with, and loves.
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sions. Use of the best interests standard allows both the court and the
guardian to justify following their views and ignoring the wishes of the
incompetent patient.
Karen Thompson argued that not only did Sharon express her
choice of Karen as guardian after the auto accident, but also that Sharon
expressed the same choice prior to her incompetency by c.oosing to love
and live with Karen. 156 The court acknowledged that "[p]reference of
the ward is an important factor,"' 157 but then ignored the argument that
Sharon's choices made prior to the accident actually demonstrated
Sharon's preferences. The court stated only that Sharon's current ex-
pression of her desires and preferences were "inconsistent and, at times,
unreliable"'158 and thus could be discounted. The court added that
"[e]ven if the ward could indicate her preference, the guardian is bound
.. to balance her wishes with her best interest. These factors may not be
in agreement."' 159
The court upheld the appointment of Donald Kowalski as his
daughter's guardian as being in Sharon's "best interests."1 60 The only
reason given for this determination was that medical testimony showed
that Sharon "enters a detrimental, depressed state after Thompson's vis-
its.' 161 The court admitted that "[a] pattern has developed indicating
Thompson's visits may produce significant responses from the ward," but
concluded that termination of Karen Thompson's visits with Sharon was
in Sharon's "best interest" because "the ward regularly experiences de-
pression and moodiness following Thompson's visits.' 62 Yet, it seems
understandable that a patient confined to a hospital would be upset and
depressed to see her lover's visits come to an end, knowing that she had
to stay behind, while her lover returned to their home without her. Pre-
sumably, the patient also would get depressed and feel lonely between
visits, especially when she was used to living with and seeing her lover
every day. One can certainly imagine that legally married couples would
feel much the same way if one spouse were confined to a hospital and
156. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 865. Karen Thompson also could have argued that because
she and Sharon had lived together on a day-to-day basis for four years, and since Sharon had
not lived with her parents or seen or spoken to them on a daily basis for more than four years,
that Karen was in a much better position than Sharon's parents to know Sharon's current
beliefs and desires about lifestyle, medical treatment, and place of abode. Familarity with the
ward's personal wishes is particularly important in the substituted judgment model, which
compels the court and guardian to act in accordance with what the ward would have done if
competent; but familarity with the patient and her wishes also should serve in determining the
patient's best interests.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 867.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 865.
161. Id. at 864.
162. Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
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would exhibit the same moodiness and depression following visits. Yet,
this behavior in a married person surely would never be justification for
terminating visitation from his or her spouse.
In Minnesota, whose law controlled the case, the court is supposed
to "disregard the application of a family member if their interest and
those of the ward would conflict."' 163 Donald Kowalski's interests con-
flicted with those of Sharon Kowalski about her lifestyle. Donald Ko-
walski, given his opinions about gay people, 164 was extremely unqualified
to serve as the guardian of a lesbian woman, regardless of his and his
daughter's blood relationship. This is true whether judged on the best
interests or substituted judgment standard. 165
The judge's own homophobic feelings are apparent from the lan-
guage of the opinion. The opinion stated that "[t]he relationship between
Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson is uncertain,"' 166 yet also ac-
knowledged that Sharon and Karen "had been roommates for four years
prior to the accident, had exchanged rings, and had named each other as
beneficiary in their life insurance policies." 167 Clearly, the actions of
Karen and Sharon are strong evidence of the existence of a committed,
quasi-spousal relationship between the two women. Roommates do not
usually name each other as beneficiaries in insurance policies if their rela-
tionship is truly that of just roommates. Also, the exchange of rings is a
powerful symbol in modern Western society, usually signifying a serious
commitment and relationship. It is difficult to discern what circum-
stances would have convinced the court of the existence of a quasi-
spousal relationship between the two women.' 68
163. Id. at 865 (quoting Schmidt v. Hebeisen, 347 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
164. Donald Kowalski stated in an interview: "'On the farm and in the Army we called
them queers and fruits, not gays and lesbians.' Kowalski further stated that Karen would
never be granted guardianship because 'there ain't a law in the United States that allows a
lesbian relationship.' " San Francisco Chron., Sept. 11, 1988 (This World), at 11.
165. Objectively, it is not in a patient's best interest for someone with extreme disapproval
of the patient's lifestyle and of the patient's life partner to control decisions for the patient.
The reasonable person in this situation would not choose Donald Kowalski as guardian. Sub-
jectively, Donald Kowalski probably would not be able to overlook his own strongly held
viewpoints in order to effectuate Sharon's choices. In addition, this schism of values leads to
real doubt as to whether the father and daughter were really close enough for him even to be
able to ascertain her viewpoints and make decisions from her point of view.
166. 382 N.W.2d at 863.
167. Id. (emphasis added). If Sharon had been living with a member of the opposite sex,
even without all the other evidence, the court probably would have accepted the existence of a
serious relationship between them. There is a presumption in society that any time a man and
woman are close, and especially when they are living in the same house or apartment, that they
are involved in a serious, sexual relationship. In same-sex relationships, however, the opposite
presumption is made; even when there is evidence of such a relationship, the court treats the
relationship as merely a friendship.
168. Even if the court had believed the two women shared a quasi-spousal relationship, it
still could have appointed Sharon's father as guardian and allowed him to bar Karen from
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Moreover, it is difficult to see what else Karen and Sharon could
have done to establish such a relationship. Gay couples are unable to
marry legally, often are unable to live openly as a couple because of job
or housing discrimination, and suffer family and societal condemnation
and even violent attacks. Sharon and Karen had more evidence of their
intimate, marital equivalent relationship than many gay couples probably
have. Yet the court deemed the relationship "uncertain" 169 because
"Sharon had closed their joint bank account," 70 and because Sharon's
sister claimed that Sharon had said "she was considering moving to Col-
orado or moving home171 and that Karen Thompson was becoming very
possessive." 172
Of course, there are many reasons to close a joint bank account,17 3
and many married couples choose not to have joint accounts without the
nature of their relationship being called into question. Sharon and Karen
continued to live together, to hold life insurance policies naming each
other as beneficiary, and to wear each other's rings. 17 4 The court seemed
to seize on the closed bank account and Sharon's alleged statements to
her sister about moving, and assumed that since the women might have
been experiencing problems in their relationship, the court did not have
to deal with the existence of a serious relationship between the two wo-
men. This rationale is inconsistent. Acknowledging that there may have
been problems between the two presupposes that a relationship existed.
The court continued, "Karen Thompson claims a lesbian relation-
ship with Sharon Kowalski. Sharon never told her family of such a rela-
tionship or admitted it prior to the accident." 175 The choice of the
seeing Sharon. Currently, the law does not extend spousal privileges and priorities to quasi-
spousal relationships. The law should do so particularly in cases involving unmarried gay
couples whose relationships may be as committed as one % ould find in any marriage, but who
are not allowed to legally marry.
169. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863.
170. Id.
171. The fact that the court uses the word "home" to refer to Sharon's parents' house,
when Sharon had not lived there for more than four years, suggests the court's bias in the case.
172. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863.
173. Indeed, Karen Thompson explains that:
Sharon and I had decided a month before the accident to close our joint account. At
that time Sharon was making no money to contribute to the house expenses (and the
purpose of the joint account was to pay mutual expenses), so it seemed silly to pay
bank charges for an account we weren't using. Based on that mutual decision, I
closed the joint account.... But we weren't able to present these points to the appel-
late court.
K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 2, at 181.
174. In fact, the joint bank account may have been the most difficult of all of these to
change, requiring signatures of both women, as joint holders of the account, in order to close
it. On the other hand, Sharon could have moved out, returned the ring, or changed her insur-
ance policy unilaterally.
175. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863 (emphasis added). Given Donald Kowalski's attitudes
April 1990]
pejorative verb "admitted" implies that homosexuality is something that
should give rise to guilt and shame.1 76 And while the court accepted the
testimony of Sharon's parents and sister at face value, it characterized
Karen's statements as merely "claims,"' 77 implying that she was lying
and untrustworthy.178 The outcome of the case is apparent just from
observing the judge's wording in the opinion's initial statement of facts.
Similarly, the judge's attitude toward people with disabilities is ap-
parent from the first paragraph of the facts.
[Sharon Kowalski] is confined to a wheelchair. Her communication
skills are limited to hand and face signals, pointing to written words,
one-finger typing on an electric typewriter, and physical displays of
emotion. She often gives inconsistent responses. She is burdened with
a child's mental capacity between four and six years of age. ' 79
After characterizing Sharon as a diminished, broken person, reduced to
being a child again, the court and the guardian easily could justify their
decisions to discount Sharon's wishes and choices about her own life, to
deny her right to autonomy and self-determination, and to substitute
their own choices as being what is really for Sharon's own good. This
language, focusing on her limitations rather than her capabilities, dehu-
manized Sharon. Much like viewing the glass as half empty rather than
half full, this type of characterization limits Sharon and other people
with disabilities far more than their physical injuries do.
In re Guardianship of Kowalski thus illustrates the preference for
legal family members in guardianship appointment. The Kowalski court
acted from the presumption that Sharon's father was the best guardian
because he was her closest legal relative despite evidence that Sharon had
a much closer relationship with Karen Thompson and would have pre-
ferred Karen as guardian. This case also illustrates the unfettered discre-
tion trial courts possess in appointing guardians and the absolute power
toward gay people in general, see supra note 164, which presumably Sharon knew about from
previous similar comments, it is not surprising that she did not tell her parents about her
sexuality or her relationship with Karen.
176. Indeed, the fact that the two women were lesbian lovers may have been the impetus
for appointing Donald Kowalski guardian and giving him the paternalistic power to "rescue"
his daughter from that lifestyle, much as the parents in Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App.
3d 952, 972-73, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 246 (1977), wanted to "save" their adult children from the
Unification Church. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. Surely, if Karen and
Sharon had been just roommates and good friends, neither the guardian nor the court would
have banned Karen from ever seeing Sharon again.
177. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863.
178. The court did not posit why, in a society where homosexual people face job and
housing discrimination, physical and verbal assaults, and even criminal penalties in some
states, Karen Thompson would lie about her relationship with Sharon. Thompson had much
to lose and nothing material to gain by announcing her sexual preference in such a public
manner.
179. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
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the guardian has once appointed. Most importantly, it illustrates the
need for change.
IV. Current State of the Law
The goal of the law of guardianship and proxy decisionmaking is to
empower someone to do either what is best for the patient or, preferably,
what the patient herself would do if she were competent.1 80 According
to one commentator, the law's preference for legal relatives results from
trying to implement this goal:
The law confers the power to consent on the next-of-kin, not because a
relative has an independent legal interest in the patient's health, but on
the theory that a close relative is likely to know the patient's attitudes
and to have his best interests at heart. The rule serves to approximate
the patient's wishes, by appointing as a stand-in the person that most
patients would appoint for themselves.... Thus, the effect of the cur-
rent law is to nominate the person whom the patient probably would
have chosen as his agent, to make the decision the patient probably
would have made if competent. 181
There is certainly evidence that in many cases the appointment of a fam-
ily member is indeed what the patient would have wanted,1 82 and that
the relative does have the patient's best interests at heart and is familiar
enough with the patient's values and desires to be able to effectuate the
patient's own will in making certain decisions. Keeping in mind the
goals of the law and remembering that the only valid reason for ap-
pointing family members is because they often fulfill those goals, one
must reject a per se rule that the court automatically should appoint the
nearest available relative to act on behalf of an incapacitated adult or that
the hospital always should look to relatives and abide by their decisions.
Clearly, when a court searches for a relative distant both in terms of
consanguinity and intimacy of relationship, and empowers her to ap-
prove an amputation for a patient who has refused to submit to the oper-
180. The substituted judgment standard requires that a surrogate attempt to reach
the decision that the incapacitated person would make if he or she were able to
choose. As a result, the patient's own definition of 'well-being' is respected; indeed,
the patient's interest in 'self-determination' is preserved to a certain extent.... The
Commission believes that, when possible, decisionmaking for incapacitated patients
should be guided by the principle of substituted judgment, which promotes the un-
derlying values of self-determination and well-being better than the best interests
standard does.
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 132-36; see also Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750, 370 N.E.2d 417,
430 (1977) ("goal is to determine with as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the
individual involved").
181. Note, supra note 59, at 1011 (footnotes omitted).
182. See infra note 197.
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ation, 183 the goals of the law are not being served. When courts are more
concerned with who is paying the bills for the incompetent person than
with what the patient wants,184 the goals of the law are being ignored.
When family members are allowed to ignore the previously expressed
wishes of the incapacitated adult, the goals of the law are not being
met. 185 When statutes and cases provide that a relative has a "right" to
make decisions for an incompetent adult, or to be named guardian, 186
neither goal-the best interests of the patient nor the rights and desires of
the patient-is being served.
The current state of the law fails to meet the goal of self-determina-
tion and best interests for those incapacitated adults who would not
choose a family member as their surrogate decisionmaker, or for those
who would not choose the particular relative to whom the law gives pref-
erence. The law still is built on the premise that family members are
close geographically and emotionally, as well as in degree of kinship.
While this often may be true, and the relative may indeed be the best
proxy, such is not always the case. 187
In the last two decades, statistics and news reports often have pro-
claimed that society is changing radically. The divorce rate is rising
quickly, 188 fewer people are getting married at all, 189 more people are
183. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Center v. Levitt, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d
356 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). See the text accompanying notes 109-14 for a discussion of this
case.
184. See the text accompanying notes 57-59 for cases, and notes 98-100 and accompanying
text for statutes, that emphasize financial and property concerns. In this regard, it seems that
the probate court, where guardianship proceedings usually are conducted, is the wrong court
to decide such issues. Probate courts usually are concerned with processing wills and adminis-
tering estates, not protecting a powerless person's civil rights. Perhaps at one time, guardian-
ship proceedings were more concerned with protecting the estate of the ward than personal
rights, but this should no longer be the case. Continuing to hold proceedings in probate court
sends the wrong signal about what is at stake and what should be the focus in appointing a
guardian-the individual interests and rights of the ward.
185. In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987). See supra text
accompanying notes 128-36. Cf Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 430-33,
497 N.E.2d 626, 633-35 (1986) (in which the patient's previously expressed opinions about
receiving life support were used to justify allowing his wife to order his nasogastric tube re-
moved, causing the patient to die of starvation and dehydration. The court stated that this was
an exercise of the patient's right of self-determination.).
186. See supra notes 91, 105-08 and accompanying text.
187. Family members are most likely to know the preferences of the patient and
other family members. On the other hand, they are more likely than others to be
emotionally and psychologically disturbed by a patient's impending death. Guilt or
other emotions might lock them into a narrow perspective .... And perhaps, less
nobly, concern over costs, effects on other members of the family, or even latent
animosities might inject improper considerations into their death control decisions.
Note, supra note 59, at 1002 n.17 (quoting M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS AND LAW 697 (1981)).
188. "The divorce ratio (the number of currently divorced persons per 1,000 currently
[Vol. 41
PROXY DECISIONMAKING
waiting longer to tie the knot, °90 more unmarried people are having chil-
dren,191 adult children often move far away from childhood homes for
educational or employment opportunities, and extended step-families
have become the norm. 192 In short, the image of the traditional, nuclear
family portrayed in 1950s television programs-never fully accurate-
has changed quite a bit, 193 yet many aspects of society, including the law,
hold outdated images and premises about the American family.
Unmarried heterosexual and homosexual1 94 couples form significant
minorities within the United States population. 195 Not surprisingly,
many people would prefer that someone outside their immediate legal
family make decisions for them if they ever become incapacitated. In a
recent poll, two percent of the people surveyed said that they would want
a close friend to make decisions for them. 196 Even though the common-
married persons living with their spouse) has increased from 47 in 1970 to 100 in 1980 to 128
in 1985." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-
23, No. 150, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES 1984/85, at 2 (1987) [hereinafter
POPULATION PROFILE].
189. In 1985, 2 million unmarried couples headed households and 20.6 million persons
lived alone. Id. "Unmarried couples totaled 2,334,000 ... in 1987-745,000 ... more than in
1980." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC SERIES P-20, No. 423, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1987 (1988) [hereinafter MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING AR-
RANGEMENTS]. See also Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 831 (1976) (serious relationships between unmarried adults are "pervasive" and
"prevalent" in modem society); Willemsen, Justice Tobriner and the Tolerance of Evolving
Lifestyles: Adapting the Law to Social Change, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 74 (1977) ("The number
of unmarried couples living together increased eightfold in the 1960's, and there are no signs
that this trend will reverse itself.").
190. POPULATION PROFILE, supra note 188, at 2 (1987) ("median age at first marriage
was 25.5 years for men and 23.3 years for women in 1985"); MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 189, at 1 ("Among all 29-year-olds, 24.9... percent had not yet
married for the first time, compared with 19.1 ... percent in 1980.").
191. See, eg., POPULATION PROFILE, supra note 188, at I (about 18 percent of women
who had a child between June 1984 and June 1985 were not married, whether single, widowed,
or divorced, at the survey date).
192. Jarmulowski, The Blended Family: Who are They?, Ms. MAG. 33 (Feb. 1985).
193. "What was once the stereotypical family-a married couple with children under 18
years old living at home-represented only 48 percent of all families and 28 percent of all
households in 1985." POPULATION PROFILE, supra note 188, at 2.
194. Ten percent of the U.S. population generally is estimated to be homosexual. Rivera,
Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 800 n.4 (1979) (estimating that in 1977 9.13 percent of the population, or
about 19 million people, were gay). This statistic is not meant to imply that all gay people
would prefer nonrelatives to act as surrogate decisionmakers, but homosexuality does increase
the likelihood that a person will be involved in a legally unrecognized relationship. Presuma-
bly both homosexual and heterosexual people involved in committed relationships would pre-
fer their partner to act for them, just as most married people would prefer their spouse to act in
their behalf. Unfortunately, the law only recognizes the validity of the latter preference.
195. More than 2 million people are hard to ignore. See supra note 189.
196. 2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MEDICINE AND
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law and statutory preferences do agree with the majority of people re-
sponding to this poll, 197 generalizing the results of this particular poll to
the United States population at large means that about five million peo-
ple would prefer a close friend as surrogate decisionmaker.
In addition, the current AIDS epidemic may result in more cases in
which the lover of an incapacitated adult will have to fight the judicial
and medical systems, the patient's legal family, and society's views in
order to have a say in the patient's treatment and living conditions, and
perhaps in order to visit the patient. Young adults rarely become inca-
pacitated; serious car accidents, drug overdoses, physical attacks, or seri-
ous illnesses are the most common threats, and these occur relatively
infrequently. The prevalence of AIDS, however, makes the threat of in-
capacity for young adults more likely. Because of the frequent occur-
rence of AIDS among gay men, who may not legally marry their
partners, there is great potential for more conflict over the presumptive
role and power the legal family is given to the exclusion of others who
have a significant place in the patient's life.
Courts must not use consanguinity as a substitute for a real factual
inquiry and finding that results in the selection of the person who is truly
the closest to the incompetent person, who truly knows the patient's
opinions and desires best, and who is truly the person the incapacitated
person herself would have trusted to make the decisions. Courts must
make sure that the closest relative in terms of consanguinity is also the
closest person to the patient in personal relations before that relative is
determined to be the correct proxy decisionmaker. 19 Some courts al-
ready have followed this course of action, even if it has taken more time
and effort. 199 But courts must do more. If a family member's values
conflict with those of the incapacitated person, then that family member
should not be appointed guardian, because it seems certain that the inca-
pacitated person would not feel the most comfortable with the relative as
proxy, and the relative probably would be unable to put the patient's
personal values first and act only on them.2°° The patient's self-determi-
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 240 (1982)
[hereinafter, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. In addition, 31 percent preferred that their
doctor make the decisions, 2 percent wanted a lawyer to decide and 6 percent chose their
doctor with their family or friend. Id.
197. The poll found that 57 percent wanted family members to make decisions for them.
Id.
198. A rigid rule vesting the power to consent in the spouse or next-of-kin may, in
some instances, give power to a person with interests plainly adverse to the patient-
an adult child eager to inherit the patient's property, a spouse who goes to pieces in a
crisis, a sibling who has been a lifelong enemy of the patient.
Note, supra note 59, at 1003 n.119.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
200. Just as one state provides that the guardian of an adherent to faith-healing should
share the patient's beliefs, supra note 96, guardians should share important values with the
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nation interest would not be served. Even if there is no conflict, the per-
son with the closest relationship to the patient should be appointed,
regardless of whether that person is a legal relative, spousal equivalent,
or close friend. If the patient's wishes about the ultimate decisions some-
times are deemed controlling,20 1 her wishes about less compelling mat-
ters such as with whom she wants to associate, as expressed by actions
before the incapacity, should also be controlling.
Many cases characterize the incapacitated adult as if she were a
child,2 2 and accordingly proceed as if the parents or nearest adult rela-
tive were the natural choice for guardian or decisionmaker. While some
incapacitated adults may become childlike, they do not magically be-
come children again. These people were once competent adults, free to
make their own choices;20 3 the choices that they have made should not be
ignored or swept away because of incapacity. If a person chooses to live
with or love someone, or to live in a certain place or way while she is a
competent adult, those choices should continue to be honored if she be-
comes incompetent. A patient's significant other, friends, and life deci-
sions do not vanish as if they never existed because a court, the patient's
relatives, or both, treat her like a child again. The course that the patient
set for herself must be continued if true self-determination is the goal of
the law, even if her relatives, the court, or even most of society disap-
prove of that course.2 ° I
There is another reason why it is important to honor an incapaci-
tated adult's choices and preferences in naming a decisionmaker and in
making substitute decisions. Unlike a minor child or an elderly person
who needs a guardian, unless the incapacity is temporary, an incapaci-
tated adult likely will live a long time with her disability and with the
decisions made for her. For example, Sharon Kowalski easily could have
lived for fifty years under the domain of her father as guardian and of the
replacement he could have named for himself in his will. Such scenarios
make it imperative that the court appoint someone who can effectuate
patient beyond just religious views. For example, a man who calls gay people "queers and
fruits," see supra note 164, should never be given plenary guardianship powers over a lesbian.
This man would not have respect for the lesbian woman's lifestyle and significant relationships
and consequently would not effectuate the patient's wishes about her place of abode, visitors,
and other issues.
201. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
202. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
203. Even if that choice is to join the Unification Church, parents are powerless to prevent
their adult children from choosing it. See Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141
Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977).
204. Indeed, in our legal system, one of the most important roles of the courts has been to
protect minorities from oppressive majoritarian decisionmaking.
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the patient's right to self-determination. Otherwise, the guardianship ap-
pointment can be a life sentence for the patient.
In addition, a case like Sharon Kowalski's implicates constitutional
concerns. First, basing legal preferences on family relationships discrimi-
nates against same-sex couples because such couples cannot establish a
legal family relationship. 20 5 Unmarried heterosexual cohabitators may
choose to forego the considerable legal, financial, and psychological bene-
fits of marriage. 20 6 Marriage, however, is still always an option. This
option is unavailable to same-sex couples, solely because of their sexual
preference. Thus, classifications based on marital status discriminate dis-
proportionately against homosexual couples because the opportunity to
marry is denied to same-sex couples. This situation should violate equal
protection of the law. 20 7
If the goal of the law in proxy decisionmaking and guardianship is
truly to promote the self-determination of the patient by empowering the
person who best knows the patient to act for her, then any significant
relationships the patient has must be recognized. This is especially true
when the relationship constitutes a marriage in all but legal aspects. If
the policies of the law are served by giving the highest preference and
deference to a married patient's spouse, and in most cases they are,20 8
then the same policies would be served by giving preferential treatment
to a patient's chosen partner, whether the couple is legally married or
not. The goals of the law are not served by stopping the inquiry at
whether the patient has a legal spouse, when there very well may be a
significant other who fulfills the same role for the patient, and who is her
spouse for all practical purposes.
The goals of the law are not fulfilled by following a rigid rule that
empowers the patient's parents or closest blood relative if there is no
205. Some gay couples do try to adopt one another in order to establish a legally recog-
nized relationship. See Note, Marital Status Classifications: Protecting Homosexual and Het-
erosexual Cohabitators, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111, 114 (1986) (authored by Stacey Lynne
Boyle).
206. For example, married people receive:
preferential tax treatment, a right of action with regard to a [spouse's] fatal accident,
... social security benefits, and the protection of the law of intestate succession.
Moreover, the married couple benefits from innumerable nongovernmental benefits
such as employee family health care, group insurance, lower automobile insurance,
family memberships in various organizations, and the ability to hold real estate by
the entirety. Beyond these legal and economic benefits, marriage is ... psychologi-
cally beneficial to the participants by strengthening the stability, emotional health,
and societal respectability of the relationship.
Rivera, supra note 194, at 874.
207. See Note, supra note 205, at 117-34.
208. Certainly the court should still make a factual inquiry into the nature of the spouses'
relationship, to make sure it is still on good terms. A spouse or spousal equivalent ordinarily
should be the person closest to the patient, and consequently the best choice, absent evidence
of a breakdown in the relationship or physical or emotional abuse by one spouse.
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legal spouse. A spouse is the legally preferred proxy for an incapacitated
adult because the marital relationship is presumed to be closer and more
intimate than any other relationship an adult has. Spouses, like partners
and close friends, evidence a chosen relationship unlike family relation-
ships, which are accidents of birth. Thus, the use of the term "spouse" in
statutes and cases is really just shorthand for all that the marital relation-
ship embodies. The goals of the law would be served better by expanding
the definition to include spousal equivalents, people with an intimate re-
lationship just like a marriage who, by choice or because of legal prohibi-
tion, are not legally married. The law is unfair and arbitrary when it
draws the line at legal spouses, and it defeats the goals of proxy decision-
making and guardianship.
Freedom of association also is impinged when someone the incom-
petent adult chooses to associate with and love is barred from participat-
ing in the decisionmaking process or from even seeing the patient. No
one should have the power to ban a significant loved one from another
adult's life.20 9 That this can occur is an indictment of the entire guardi-
anship process. Guardians are granted too much power if they can tram-
ple the patient's civil rights in this manner. Certainly the freedom to
associate with whomever one wishes, especially in the area of intimate
personal relationships, is a fundamental individual right, 210 and one
should not lose that right because of incapacity. "The trend in the law
has been to give incompetent persons the same rights as other individu-
als. '211 Neither the courts nor parents nor other relatives of the incompe-
tent adult patient should have the power to violate the patient's choices,
or her freedom of association. 212 "The rights to choose who you talk to,
who you visit, who you befriend, and who you love are the most basic of
constitutional and human rights. They are fundamental to our concept
of what it is to be a human being. '2 13
209. A person might be banned or at least restricted from unsupervised visitation if the
court determined from evidence that the significant other has physically or emotionally abused
or neglected the now incapacitated partner.
210. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
211. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747, 370
N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977); see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 245, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (1981);
Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technology and
Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CRE!GHTON L. REv. 795, 806 (1980) ("minors and incompe-
tents are said to be possessed of all rights attributable to competent adults").
212. In Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977), the court
overturned the guardianship appointments of the parents of five young adults because the par-
ents wanted the guardianship in order to take physical custody of the adults and have them
"deprogrammed" of their religious beliefs. The court held that the guardianship appointments
would violate the adults' freedom of association. Id. at 988-89, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256. The
court stated that when "restraint on one's person" is involved, "fundamental rights are at
stake." Id. at 968, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
213. K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 2, at 171; (quoting the amicus brief
of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union filed in the Kowalski case).
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V. Attempted Solutions
Some states and courts have attempted to broaden common-law
preferences for legal family members and give the patient more power of
self-determination or include more of the patient's loved ones in the deci-
sionmaking process. For example, at least thirty-three states and the
District of Columbia have statutes providing for the use of living wills,
with which a competent adult can express her wishes about the use of
extraordinary life-sustaining care in the event the adult ever becomes in-
competent. 214 Living wills, however, primarily are limited to life-sus-
taining treatment and life-and-death decisions. Many cases are not that
extreme, and these are the cases in which the patient must continue to
live under the dominion of a guardian or other proxy. Also, technicali-
ties in the statute may frustrate the patient's intentions. For example, in
California, the person must be diagnosed as terminally ill, then wait four-
teen days before drafting a living will in order for it to be effective. 215 In
addition, as one commentator has observed, "no living will-no matter
how broadly or how specifically worded-can possibly anticipate the full
range of difficult medical decisions to be made. Inevitably, questions of
interpretation arise concerning whether an incompetent patient's actual
situation conforms to the situatioli described in the living will." '216
214. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210
(1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -217 (Supp. 1989), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West. Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 & Supp.
1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to .15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-4101 to -4112
(1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
paras. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns Supp.
1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101-28,
109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to 2931 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH - GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614
(Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -111 (1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540 to .690 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to :16
(Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323
(1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 97.050 to .090 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (1987); VA.
CODE .ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 2992 (1988 & Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1989).
215. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1989). "Yet only about half
of all patients diagnosed as terminally ill remain conscious for the requisite fourteen days; for
the other half-and for all of the patients with nonterminal conditions-the California law
makes no provision." Note, supra note 59, at 999-1000 (footnote omitted).
216. Note, supra note 59, at 999 (footnotes omitted).
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All fifty states and the District of Columbia statutorily authorize the
execution of durable 17 powers of attorney, 218 but these documents for
the most part can be used to enable an agent to act for the principal only
in matters of property and finances, not in matters involving health
care.2 19 Six states now provide for the execution of durable powers of
attorney for health care.220
While the expanded version of durable powers of attorney is a step
in the right direction, durable powers of attorney still do not go far
enough. A court apparently has the power to terminate the appointment
or to appoint a guardian, whose power would supersede that of the
217. "Durable" means that the appointment continues to be effective even when the prin-
cipal becomes incapacitated. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 2400 (West. Cum. Supp. 1990); Note,
supra note 59, at 1009.
218. ALA. CODE § 26-1-2 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.325, 13.26.330 (1985); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5501 to -5502 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-68-201 to -203 (1987),
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2400-2407 (West. Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-501 to -502
(1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4901-4905 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2081 to -2085
(1989); FLA. STAT. § 709.08 (1988 & Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-2-21 (Harrison 1989);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:5-501, -502 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-501 to -507 (1979 & Supp.
1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 802-1 to -11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-2-11-1 to -7 (Burns 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.705 to .706 (West Supp.
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-610 to -617 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 386.093 (Baldwin
1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3027 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 5-501 (Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § § 13 -601 to -602 (1974); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201B, §§ 1-7 (West 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN., §§ 700.495 to .499 (West
1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § § 523.07 to .08 (West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 87-3-13
(Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 486.550 to .595 (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-
5-501 to -502 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2664 to -2672 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 111.460 to 470 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:6 (1983 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46:2B-8, -9 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501 to -502 (1989); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1601 to -1602 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-8 to -14 (1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-01 to 05 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.09 to
.092 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1051 to 1063 (West Supp.
1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.407, 126.413 (1984); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5604 to 5606
(Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-22-6.1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-501 to -
502 (Law. Co-op.1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to -2.4 (1978); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-6-101 to -107 (1984); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp.
1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-501 to -502 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 14, §§ 3051 to 3052
(Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9.1 to 9.2 (1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 11.94.010
to .020 (1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 39-4-I to -7 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 243.07 (West
1982); Wyo. STAT. §§ 3-5-101 to -103 (1985).
219. "[T]he durable power of attorney has seldom been used in a medical decisionmaking
context, and it is possible that the courts might construe the statutes narrowly to exclude such
use." Note, supra note 59, at 1009.
220. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to 39-
4509 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 804-1 to -12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989);
NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 449.800 to .860 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to -4.10-2 (1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986).
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agent.22 1 The biggest problem with both living wills and durable powers
of attorney, however, is that few healthy, young adults plan ahead for
catastrophes. 222 No one thinks it will happen to her.
In addition to these attempts, some statutes and cases have provided
for greater autonomy for the patient and for the consideration of signifi-
cant others in the patient's life outside the patient's legal family. 223 Even
the statutes that do rank significant others as potential guardians place
the nonrelatives at the bottom of the list, after a long line of legal family
members who have priority. As for the cases, courts have so much dis-
cretion and the common law is so pro-family that a judge who happens
to consider significant relationships outside the legal family in appointing
a decisionmaker is a matter of chance.
VI. A Proposal for Change
"When it is determined that the common law or the judge-made law
is unjust or out of step with the times, we should have no reluctance to
change it .... The law is not, nor should it be, static. It must keep pace
with changes in our society .... -224
The statutes, cases, and failed attempts demonstrate the inadequa-
cies of current law. Legislatures and courts need to take action to ex-
pand the definition of the appropriate guardian or proxy decisionmaker;
to realign the procedures to ensure that they are really serving the goals
of promoting the incompetent person's best interests and self-determina-
tion; to clarify procedures so that hospitals, doctors, family members,
and other loved ones know where they stand; and to make sure that the
rights of the minority, in this case those who would prefer someone
outside their legal family to act for them, are protected. As one commen-
tary has noted:
If there is any single area of medical decision making in need of
legislative attention, it is the problem of proxy decision making. The
tremendous uncertainty as to the conditions under which a proxy is
needed, the identity of the appropriate proxy, the method of selection,
221. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-501 (1972); see also Note, supra note 59, at 1027
(listing state statutes allowing guardians to override patient's appointed agent).
222. According to one study, 36 percent of the public have expressed orally their wishes
about treatment to a friend or relative, but only about a fourth of that number have expressed
their desires in writing. 2 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 196, at 219, 241-42.
The lack of wills is another good example of the general reluctance to face one's own mortality
and prepare for the inevitable. Few people would disagree that drafting a will is a good idea.
Yet, 80 percent of Americans die without a will. Hoffmaster, Freedom to Choose, 17 TRANS-
PLANT. PROC. 24, 29 (1985).
223. See supra notes 76-82, 95-97, 125-27 and accompanying text for discussion of these
cases and statutes.
224. Butcher v. Superior Ct., 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 64, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1983).
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and the scope of the proxy's authority are all in need of substantial
clarification.225
Yet, the law is slow to change, and legislators have not hastened to
revise the medical decisionmaking process. This may be due in part to
the lack of political power of those most affected. "Adults who are
placed or who may be placed under guardianship form an amorphous
class whose legal powerlessness is unrivaled by any other segment of soci-
ety, with the possible exception of children. ' 226 Of course, this
powerlessness is precisely why the state, through legislators and judges,
must act to protect this class of individuals.
Statutes should be adopted that will replace the UPC-model list of
priorities with an instruction that courts are to consider for guardianship
or authority to make decisions all people who have significant relation-
ships with the incapacitated person. All people should receive equal con-
sideration; no preferences should be enumerated in the new statutes.
Although the statutes should not state preferences, "family" still
should receive some preferential treatment from the court because in
many cases they will be best suited to protect the patient's best interests
and self-determination. The definition of "family," however, should be
changed radically from the common-law meaning. If the patient's per-
sonal choices are to be effectuated by the court and the proxy, "family"
must signify something more than consanguinity. The President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research recognized that family members often were the
best surrogates because of concern about "the good of the patient" and
knowledge about "the patient's goals, preferences, and values. ' 227 The
Commission stated, however, that:
[T]he Commission's broad use of the term "family" reflects a recogni-
tion of the fact that often those with most knowledge and concern for a
patient are not relatives by blood or marriage .... No neat formulas
will capture the complexities involved in determining who among a
patient's friends and relatives knows the patient best and is most capa-
ble of making decisions in the patient's place.228
225. Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent
Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 407, 461 (1980) (footnote omitted).
226. Mitchell, supra note 66, at 1427.
227. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SusTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 128.
228. Id. at 127. The accompanying footnote adds,
"We have had situations where the only family member was a daughter on the West
Coast who had not seen her father for the last 20 years. He had lived with a drink-
ing buddy of his for the last 20 years. Do we ignore this friend of his whose actions
show that he cared also about him? Do we rely on the daughter who has no relation-
ship in terms of interest in this patient? Often there are no family members at all,
yet there may be friends and associates who knew the patient well. Do we ignore
them because they do not constitute the traditional concept of family?"
Id. at 127 n.20 (quoting testimony of David Spackman).
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This same recognition must be adopted by the courts to protect the self-
determination of the patient. Consanguinity no longer can take the place
of a real factual inquiry.
To overcome homophobia and stereotypes about what constitutes a
significant relationship, judges should be required to scrutinize the pa-
tient's significant relationships for evidence of stability and significance.
Marital status no longer should be the only evidence of significance. The
judge should look at the length of the relationship; whether the parties
have any contracts or documentation of commitment; whether the
couple commingles funds, is financially interdependent, or owns property
together; whether the parties are sexually monogamous; whether they are
viewed as a couple by friends or others; whether they are named as bene-
ficiaries in wills, pension plans, or insurance policies; whether they live
together; whether they have exchanged rings or vows; and whether they
are raising children together as a family. Not all of these elements must
be present, of course, and courts must be sensitive to the fact that homo-
sexual couples may meet only a few of these criteria, but still have a
significant relationship, deserving of recognition and protection as a de
facto marriage.
Whomever is determined by the court to be involved in the patient's
primary significant relationship, the person most familiar with the pa-
tient's desires and most intimate with the patient, whether that be the
patient's spouse, spousal equivalent in the case of unmarried adults, a
close friend, or a relative, should then receive guardianship and custody
of the person. 229 Only when a preponderance of the evidence shows
physical or emotional abuse or neglect on the part of the presumed
guardian should the court be allowed to deviate from this course. This
process will prevent anyone from being able to ban a patient's lover from
seeing her and will ensure that the patient's prior lifestyle will continue
to the fullest extent possible.
In addition, the guardian or decisionmaker should not have the
power to ban anyone who was a friend of the patient before the accident
from visiting the patient once she has become incompetent. Even if the
guardian is not compatible with the patient's family or friends, the pa-
tient's prior expressed choices should control, not the guardian's feelings.
Guardianship should not provide the opportunity for someone to inter-
fere with the ward's relationship with a relative or friend whom the
guardian never liked. Nor should the patient's lifestyle or place of abode
be changed without good reason. For example, Sharon Kowalski left
Minnesota's rural Iron Range to live in the city of St. Cloud, Minnesota.
Her father, as guardian, moved Sharon away from her chosen home and
229. This consideration is similar to the codes of Ohio and Massachusetts. See supra notes
141-42 and accompanying text. Someone else then could be appointed guardian of the estate if
there is concern about finances or if the guardian of the person has no business acumen.
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the friends and support system she had there back to the small town of
Hibbing.230 If better care or treatment were available outside St. Cloud,
the move might have been valid. It is improbable, however, that moving
Sharon away from her chosen home to a small town was so motivated.
Such unnecessary lifestyle changes should be prohibited. The course the
incapacitated person set for herself must be continued by the guardian,
regardless of the guardian's feelings.231
Similarly, when the court is considering who is the most significant
person in the patient's life, or when the guardian or decisionmaker is
making decisions for the patient, the patient's actions prior to incapacita-
tion should control over comments supposedly made by the patient. A
witness' memory may have faded, or the witness may have misunder-
stood or subjectively interpreted the statements. The witness also might
have a conflict of interest with either the ward or the proposed guardian,
be interested in the appointment himself, or have some other motivation
to misrepresent the incapacitated adult's comments. Since there proba-
bly would not be any way to corroborate the declarant's statement, the
court or the guardian should view testimony as to what the patient said
with suspicion, and certainly should not base decisions solely on such
testimony. Past actions of the incapacitated person, such as where she
chose to live and with whom, are more objective than statements attrib-
uted to the incapacitated person. Thus, actions should speak louder than
words.
Critics may object that these changes will require more judicial time
and reduce judicial efficiency. Perhaps efficiency will be lessened some-
what, but fairness will be greatly enhanced and the rights of a relatively
powerless group of citizens will receive greater protection. The trade-off
is justified. One of the primary purposes of the justice system is to pro-
tect civil rights and to ensure justice, not just to run parties through the
courtroom. In addition, the vast body of case law on guardianship and
proxy decisionmaking suggests that the current system does not promote
judicial economy. Many cases still end up in court.
Critics also may argue that the current presumptions in the law pro-
mote a legitimate state interest in marriage and family. In response,
however, one commentator has noted that "[t]here is not evidence that
the current and long-standing policy of promoting marriage by penaliz-
ing the unmarried encourages a heterosexual to marry if he or she was
not already so inclined, and homosexual orientation will certainly not be
changed by punishing homosexual couples with same-sex marriage
230. K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJESWKI, supra note 2, at 159. Testimony from a social
worker indicated that Sharon wanted to remain in St. Cloud. Id. at 60.
231. Substituted judgment should be adopted as the only goal of the law because it pro-
motes the self-determination and welfare of the patient better than the best interests standard,
which can be used to justify paternalistic exercise of power over the incapacitated adult, such
as in Sharon Kowalski's case. See supra note 155.
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bans. '232 In addition, the law should not be used to promote a moral
agenda at the expense of fairness and just treatment for those situated
similarly to the legally married.
Conclusion
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent.... The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding. ' 233 The law of guardianship and
proxy decisionmaking developed from a desire to protect those who can
no longer take care of themselves. This intention was surely good; yet
the rules of selection that have developed and the powers bestowed upon
the decisionmaker easily can be misused and result in anything but what
is best for the incapacitated person.
The rules and presumptions must be modernized and rethought, so
that the self-determination and well-being of the incompetent person
truly are furthered by the process, and so that no other couple ever has to
live through a tragedy, only to have it compounded by a rigid system that
arbitrarily refuses to recognize their relationship and empowers another
to destroy it.
232. Note, supra note 205, at 132. In addition, "the conventional family unit has dis-
integrated remarkably in past decades despite the benefits of marital status classifications." Id.
at 133 (footnote omitted).
233. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (over-
ruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
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